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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the practicability of adopting legislative reforms as a solution to the 
problem of gas flaring in Nigeria. While the thesis does not anticipate solving the problem of 
gas flaring in Nigeria through legislative reforms in isolation, it argues that legislative reform 
is an important step that must be undertaken by the Nigerian government as the current 
statute governing gas flaring is inadequate, ineffective, and unconstitutional. While 
examining the practicability of legislative reform, this thesis considers whether Nigeria’s 
foreign investment laws, investment treaties and/or private contractual obligations would 
impede the enactment of new gas flaring legislation and if such legislation would impact on 
international oil and gas corporations (IOCs) engaged in oil production activities in Nigeria. 
In ascertaining the practicability of legislative reforms, it considers whether legislative reform 
would be considered expropriation of an IOC’s investment, or whether stabilization clauses 
in oil and gas contracts would impact the practicability of legislative reforms. The 
practicability of legislative reform is also considered from the perspective of whether the 
Nigerian government is currently demonstrating sufficient political commitment to taking 
steps to reduce gas flaring.   
This thesis envisages legislative reforms which are twofold. First, it considers the need to 
enact new gas flaring legislation in Nigeria in order to address the shortcomings of the 
current gas flaring legislation. Second, the thesis considers the importance of incorporating 
some of the relevant international environmental standards on GHG emissions to which 
Nigeria is a party into domestic laws given the potential impact of gas flaring on climate 
change. The domestication of these standards will make some of Nigeria’s binding 
commitments in the standards that impact gas flaring enforceable in Nigeria. The new gas 
flaring legislation will also make reference to those international environmental standards on 
GHG emissions. In order to achieve these purposes, this thesis presents some of the insights 
proposed by Institutionalist Legislative Theory and Methodology (ILTAM) as a possible tool 
for designing the legislative reforms. The ILTAM offers a guide to lawmakers in structuring 
evidence-based legislation hinged on factual evidence and public reasoning with capacity for 
effective implementation. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction and Context of Research Problem 
Natural gas flaring has become a major source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that has 
proven intractable to curtail around the world.1 Gas flaring, which in the context of this 
thesis, is the burning of natural gas associated with oil and gas production, is one of the most 
damaging practices in the Nigerian petroleum industry and this has continued to give rise to 
unimaginable complex consequences in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, with regard to 
human health and natural environment.2 Nigeria’s volume of gas flaring is among the highest 
in the world and only few countries are ahead in terms of billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas 
flared yearly.3  
This thesis explores the practicability of adopting legislative reforms in Nigeria’s oil and gas 
sector as a solution to the problem of gas flaring in Nigeria. While the thesis does not 
anticipate solving the problem of gas flaring in Nigeria through legislative reforms in 
isolation, it argues that legislative reform is a necessary step that must be undertaken by the 
Nigerian government as the current statute governing gas flaring is inadequate, ineffective, 
and unconstitutional. While examining the practicability of legislative reform, this thesis 
considers whether Nigeria’s foreign investment laws, investment treaties and/or private 
contractual obligations would preclude the enactment or enforcement of new gas flaring 
legislation and if such legislation would impact on international oil companies (IOCs) 
engaged in oil production activities in Nigeria. In ascertaining the practicability of legislative 
reforms, it considers whether legislative reform would be considered expropriation of an 
IOC’s investment, or whether stabilization clauses in oil and gas contracts would impact the 
practicability of legislative reforms. The practicability of legislative reform is also considered 
from the perspective of whether the Nigerian government is currently demonstrating 
sufficient political commitment to taking steps to reduce gas flaring.  The adoption of the 
                                                          
1 Bruno Gervet, “Gas Flaring Emission Contributes to Global Warming” (2007) Renewable Energy Research 
Group Division of Architecture and Infrastructure Luleå University of Technology SE-97187, online:      
<https://www.ltu.se/cms_fs/1.5035!/gas%20flaring%20report%20-%20final.pdf> at1- 14. 
2 Anselm Ajugwo, “Negative Effects of Gas Flaring: The Nigerian Experience” (2013) 1:1 Journal of 
Environment Pollution and Human Health 6 – 8 [Ajugwo]. 
3 Nick Snow, “World Bank: Worldwide Gas Flaring increased in 2015” online: 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/2016/12/world-bank-worldwide-gas-flaring-increased-in-2015.html [Snow]. 
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National Gas Policy in 2017 and Nigeria’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) 
under the Paris Agreement, as well as other current legislative and stakeholder consultations 
help, in part, to demonstrate whether legislative reform is a feasible option at this point in 
time.   
The legislative reforms envisaged in this thesis are twofold. First, it considers the need to 
enact new gas flaring legislation in Nigeria in order to address the shortcomings of the 
current gas flaring legislation. Second, the thesis considers the importance of incorporating 
some of the relevant international environmental standards on GHG emissions to which 
Nigeria is a party into domestic laws given the potential impact of gas flaring on climate 
change. The domestication of these standards will make some of Nigeria’s binding 
commitments in the standards that impact gas flaring enforceable in Nigeria. The new gas 
flaring legislation will also make reference to those international environmental standards on 
GHG emissions. In order to achieve these purposes, this thesis presents some of the insights 
proposed by Institutionalist Legislative Theory and Methodology (ILTAM) as a possible tool 
for designing the legislative reforms. The ILTAM offers a guide to lawmakers in structuring 
evidence-based legislation  hinged on factual evidence and public reasoning with capacity for 
effective implementation.  
Several reasons have been identified within the literature for the continuous flaring of gas in 
Nigeria. First, gas flaring in Nigeria has been attributed, at least in part, to the nature and 
ineffectiveness of the principal legislation on gas flaring.4 For instance, the Associated Gas 
Re-injection Act (AGRA),5 which is the major legislation regulating gas flaring in Nigeria, 
has been largely of no consequence partly because of its outdated nature since gas flaring was 
not envisioned to become an issue of serious climatic concern as it has now become.6 
Similarly, the penalty for gas flaring under the AGRA provides justification for complacency 
on the part of IOCs and encourages the continuous flaring of gas in Nigeria. In addition, the 
meager fees paid by the IOCs as penalty for gas flaring are considered as allowable 
deductions for purposes of payment of petroleum profit tax by IOCs. Also, the provisions of 
                                                          
4 Olubisi Oluduro, “The Legal Implications of Gas Flaring on Climate Change in Nigeria” (2014) 29 Journal of 
Law, Policy and Globalization at 171 [Oluduro]. 
5 Associated Gas Re-injection Act Cap. A25, Vol. 1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 [AGRA]. 
6 Oluduro, supra note 4. 
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the AGRA are not based on broader environmental principles such as sustainable 
development and polluter pays principle. The next chapter will extensively discuss these 
inadequacies of the AGRA that, in part, make legislative reform imperative. 
Second, Nigeria has not demonstrated sufficient resolve to implement its own legal 
frameworks on gas flaring, and other problems emanating from its oil exploration activities, 
in disregard of the wellbeing of the inhabitants of the vast areas where oil production 
activities are carried out.7 This thesis contends that there are palpable areas of institutional 
overlap and duplication of the responsibilities of regulatory agencies such as the Department 
of Petroleum Resources (DPR), National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDREA), and the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement 
Agency (NESREA). This intersection in functions and responsibilities results in conflicting 
roles for monitoring and implementing of the limited gas flaring law. Also, the involvement 
of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in joint ventures (JVs) with IOCs 
undermines the regulatory capacity and effectiveness of Nigeria’s regulators. However, this 
thesis does not intend to address the issue of implementation. This stems partly from the fact 
that the new National Gas Policy and the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB) already 
make robust proposals for the effectiveness of the regulatory agencies in Nigeria’s oil and gas 
sector. In particular, the PIGB and the National Gas Policy provide for the consolidation of 
the existing regulatory agencies in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. This consolidation aims at 
addressing the intersection in functions and responsibilities of these regulatory agencies, and 
ensuring the effectiveness of the regulatory agency. Nonetheless, the monitoring and 
evaluation mechanism contained in the legislation proposed in this thesis could assist in 
ensuring effective implementation of the law. It does not usurp the powers of the 
implementing agency. 
Third, the incessant flaring of natural gas in Nigeria is a reflection of an imbalance in the 
conflicting foreign investment and environmental protection goals in Nigeria. Without doubt, 
the issue of environmental protection is gradually becoming the subject of some bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) signed by Nigeria.8 Nevertheless, the country is yet to adequately 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 See Morocco-Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty, 6 December 2016 art 13(4). This treaty is yet to be ratified 
by the parties. 
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address the incidence of gas flaring partly because of its emphasis on investment 
liberalization and investment protection without similar attention to environmental protection. 
This undue emphasis on investment liberalization and investment protection has resulted in a 
situation of unevenness between Nigeria’s right to regulate its environment and the right of 
the international oil companies (IOCs) to guaranteed protection under Nigeria’s investment 
laws,9 various BITs and customary international law.  
Fourth, gas flaring persists as a result of insufficient market and infrastructure for natural gas 
utilization in Nigeria.10 Indeed, there is an economic advantage for the proper utilization of 
natural gas as it could serve as a veritable source of foreign exchange. Associated gas could 
be conserved and utilized for the purpose of power generation within and outside Nigeria.11 
Nonetheless, the World Bank posits that Nigeria flares a substantial amount of gas annually 
while majority of its citizens lack access to electricity.12 This thesis does not focus on the 
problem of insufficient market and infrastructure because it is an issue that could be 
effectively addressed in policy. The Nigerian government recognizes this and has put in place 
policy frameworks to respond to the problem. Specifically, Nigeria has endorsed the World 
Bank’s 2030 Zero Routine Flaring Initiative13 in addition to designing a National Gas Policy. 
The National Gas Policy is aimed at achieving gas flare-out in Nigeria through gas 
utilization. It enunciates the vision of the Nigerian Government, sets out agenda, 
methodologies and an enforcement blueprint for the institution of a suitable legal and 
                                                          
9 See the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act CAP N117, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
10 See Ikechukwu Diugwu et al, “The Effect of Gas Production, Utilization, and Flaring on the Economic 
Growth of Nigeria” (2013) 4:4 Natural Resources 343; It is important to note that the problem of insufficient 
market and infrastructure does not fall within the purview of the arguments intended by this thesis. Moreso, 
Nigeria has recently demonstrated sufficient resolve to encourage gas utilization by adopting the National Gas 
Policy 2017 which is aimed at achieving gas flare-out through gas utilization. 
11 R. Hill, J. Moore, D. Boone and C. Randall, “Associated Gas Utilisation with Liquid Recovery,”  cited in 
Ikechukwu Diugwu et al, “The Effect of Gas Production, Utilization, and Flaring on the Economic Growth of 
Nigeria” (2013) 4:4 Natural Resources 343. 
12 The World Bank, “Time to End Routine Gas Flaring” online: 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/15/gas-flaring-reduction-takes-center-stage-at-global-
event>. 
13 The World Bank, “Nigeria Endorses 2030 Flaring Initiative; Raises Own Goal to 2020” online: 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/zero-routine-flaring-by-2030/brief/nigeria-endorses-zero-flaring-
initiative>. 
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regulatory structure for the Nigerian gas sector.14 In achieving its vision of gas-based 
industrialization of Nigeria, the National Gas Policy seeks to grow the domestic gas market 
by inter alia, providing alternative markets and uses for gas.15 Through the policy, the 
Nigerian government seeks to raise the gas flaring penalty to a suitable level, enough to de-
incentivize the practice of gas flaring, and at the same time presenting other strategies that 
will support efficient gas utilization.16 The policy will adopt remedial measures such as the 
creation of gas infrastructure and expansions for the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline to ensure 
sustained gas supply into the West African region. The National Gas Policy is a laudable 
policy measure with the potential to effectively address the problem of gas utilization in 
Nigeria.   
 
While this thesis acknowledges that other aspects of gas flaring reduction such as creating 
gas utilization projects and developing vital gas infrastructure and markets are essential, it 
focuses on legislative reforms. It focuses on legislative reforms for several reasons. First, the 
Associated Gas Re-injection Act (AGRA)17 which is the major legislation regulating gas 
flaring in Nigeria has been largely inadequate. In fact, in demonstrating the inadequacy of 
the AGRA, the court held that some aspects of the AGRA and its Regulations under which 
continued flaring of gas in Nigeria may be permitted are inconsistent with the rights to life 
and/or dignity of human persons enshrined in the constitution.18 The inadequacies of the 
AGRA partly inform the need for the enactment of new legislation in Nigeria. Second, the 
thesis emphasizes legislative reforms considering that gas flaring impacts the climate, and 
Nigeria’s commitments under international environmental standards on GHG emissions can 
only be enforced in Nigeria if those standards are incorporated into domestic laws. 
                                                          
14 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Ministry of Petroleum Resources, “National Gas Policy” online: 
<http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/National-Gas-Policy-Approved-By-FEC-
in-June-2017.pdf > at 13 [National Gas Policy]. 
15 Ibid at 68. 
16 Ibid at 64. 
17 AGRA, supra note 5. 
18 Johnah Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited Suit No: FHC/CS/B/153/05, 
reported in (2005) AHRLR 151 (NgHC 2005) [Gbemre v SPDC]. 
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Currently, Nigeria has signed the Paris Agreement19 but it is yet to domesticate the 
Agreement. The domestication of the Agreement will ensure that Nigeria’s obligations under 
its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are enforceable in Nigeria. The new 
legislation which this thesis proposes as part of the legislative reforms will make reference to 
those domesticated standards. It will also take cognizance of international environmental law 
principles such as sustainable development in ensuring that the legislation is in line with 
Nigeria’s foreign investment and economic plans. As noted earlier, the AGRA does not take 
environmental principles into account partly because gas flaring was not envisioned to 
become an issue of serious climatic concern as it has now become. 
This thesis does not focus on other aspects of gas flaring reduction such as creating gas 
utilization projects and developing vital gas infrastructure and markets for two reasons. First, 
the Nigerian government has recently adopted the National Gas Policy which addresses the 
problem of gas utilization and absence of vital gas infrastructure and markets. As earlier 
indicated, the National Gas Policy is aimed at achieving gas flare-out in Nigeria through gas 
utilization. It proposes to build gas markets in Nigeria through the identification and 
encouragement of local gas market development projects as well as the development and 
exploitation of regional African gas markets. The ability of the Nigerian government to meet 
the targets set in the National Gas Policy could also be dependent on the enactment of new 
legislation. Given that one of the objectives of the National Gas Policy is to encourage gas 
utilization, enacting a piece of legislation that provides for stricter penalty regime for gas 
flaring could dissuade IOCs from flaring gas, thereby inducing them to focus on gas 
utilization. Second, this thesis does not focus on developing vital gas infrastructure 
considering that the recently adopted Economic Recovery and Growth Plans (ERGP) aim at 
substantial infrastructure investment that could boost gas utilization in Nigeria.20 The plan to 
invest massively in infrastructure is partly as a result of ERGP’s anticipated increase in the 
production of crude oil and gas in Nigeria.21 The government’s plan to increase 
infrastructure investment as indicated in the ERGP could stimulate gas utilization, reduce 
                                                          
19 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “The Paris Agreement” online: 
<http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php> [Paris Agreement]. 
20 See Budgit, “Nigeria’s Economic and Growth Plans” online: < http://yourbudgit.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Economic-Recovery-Growth-Plan-2017-2020.pdf>  at 16 [ERGP]. 
21Ibid at 15. 
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gas flaring and strengthen the achievement of Nigeria’s NDCs under the Paris Agreement.22 
Although the ERGP envisages increased oil and gas production in Nigeria, the ERGP is 
consistent with Nigeria’s NDC given that part of the Nigerian government’s key strategies 
for improving governance of the oil and gas sector under the ERGP include reducing gas 
flaring, implementing gas commercial framework, and increasing gas utilization.23 
Several legislative measures have been adopted by the Nigerian government towards 
addressing the problems confronting Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. Following agitations by 
Nigerians for the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill which seeks to reform the industry 
and to inter alia put an end to gas flaring, the Nigerian Senate and House of Representatives 
only recently passed the harmonized Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB).24 The 
PIGB is the first in a number of much-anticipated petroleum industry bills expected to 
restructure the Nigerian petroleum industry.25 The PIGB will administer policies affecting 
parts of petroleum operations which are allocated to it under the Act.26 However, the PIGB 
does not address gas flaring.  
The foremost oil and gas legislation in Nigeria was the Petroleum Ordinance of 1889 which 
preceded the Mineral Regulation (Oil) Ordinance of 1907.27 At the moment, pending the full 
enactment of the PIGB, the Petroleum Act 1969 and the regulations made thereunder28 are the 
                                                          
22 The ERGP is consistent with Nigeria’s NDC under the Paris Agreement given that it makes explicit provision 
on gas flaring reduction. It also emphasizes infrastructure development in light of an anticipated increase in oil 
and gas production in Nigeria. Infrastructure development would entail developing infrastructure for gas 
utilization in Nigeria.  
23 ERGP, supra note 20 at 69. 
24 As at September 12, 2018, this Bill was not in force. The Bill has been sent back to the National Assembly for 
corrections. 
25 The Senate Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Report of the Senate Joint Committee on the Petroleum Industry 
Governance Bill 2017” online: <http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/FINAL-
COPY-OF-PETROLEUM-INDUSTRY-GOVERNANCE-BILL-2017-May-15.pdf> at 2 [PIGB]. 
26 Ibid at 1-91. 
27 Ibironke Tinuola Odumosu, “Reforming Gas Flaring Laws in Nigeria: The Transferability of the Alberta 
Regulatory Framework”, online: (2005) ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global MR06123 at 126 
<<https://search-proquest-
com.cyber.usask.ca/docview/305029958/abstract/87FA926FA050476APQ/1?accountid=14739> [Odumosu 
2005]. 
28 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations L.N. 69 1969 Laws of Federation of Nigeria Cap P 10 2004 
[Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations]. 
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most comprehensive laws regulating oil and gas production and exploration in Nigeria. 
Through the Petroleum Act 1969, the Nigerian government made its first attempt to stop gas 
flaring when it brought matters relating to the pollution of the waters and the atmosphere 
under the control of the Minister overseeing Petroleum issues, and mandated a licensee to 
submit to the Minister, within a period of five years, a proposal for gas utilization (whether 
associated or not), discovered within the area.29 The Petroleum Act of 1969 and its 
regulations’ initial attempts to curtail the incidence of gas flaring in Nigeria proved futile as 
gas flaring continued. Presently, the principal legislation devoted to gas flaring reduction in 
Nigeria is the Associated Gas Re-injection Act (AGRA).30 Accordingly, in analyzing the 
inadequacies of the existing legislation for gas flaring reduction in Nigeria, this thesis will 
focus on the AGRA. 
In light of the failure of earlier legislative responses to gas flaring, the question arises 
regarding the feasibility of legislative reform. This thesis contends that legislative reforms 
proposed in this thesis could work at this time considering that the Nigerian government is 
beginning to demonstrate willingness to address gas flaring including through legislative 
measures.31 Nigeria has also recently adopted a National Gas Policy and has endorsed the 
World Bank’s 2030 Zero Routine Flaring Initiative. As will be discussed in the next chapter, 
the initiative sets clear gas flaring reduction goals for the future. It differs from the earlier 
World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR) as GGFR’s objective is not 
to set such goals, but to aid flaring mitigation activities in order to meet the 2030 goal.32 
                                                          
29 Petroleum Act, Cap P10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 at section 9. 
30 AGRA, supra note 5. 
31 There is an indication that the Nigerian government is willing to adopt a legislative response to gas flaring. 
Just as this thesis was being finalized, the Federal Government of Nigeria issued the new Flare Gas (Prevention 
of Waste and Pollution) Regulations 2018 in an attempt to make gas more available for local use and get Nigeria 
closer to ending gas flaring. The contents of this Regulation have not been made public. Only reports by the 
public on the regulation are available. The reports show that the Regulation focuses on commercialization of gas 
which appears to be an aspect of what Nigeria needs. The reports state that the Regulation seeks to create a 
framework for the National Gas Flare Commercialization Programme (NGFCP), increase rates for flare gas 
payments, and provide strict metering and reporting obligations. It is important to note that increasing gas flare 
penalties is also one of the arguments canvassed in this thesis. One cannot rely so much on the provisions of the 
Regulation since the Regulation has not been made public as yet. The Regulation is also not a comprehensive 
response to gas flaring in the way that this thesis envisions. See Advisory Legal Consultants, “3 Things to Note 
About the New Flare Gas Regulations 2018” online:  <https://mailchi.mp/c400741bbbb7/client-alert-new-flare-
gas-regulations-1213541> [New Flare Gas Regulations 2018]. 
32 The World Bank, “Zero Routine Flaring by 2030” online: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/zero-
routine-flaring-by-2030#7> [World Bank Zero Routine Flaring by 2030]. 
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Nigeria’s endorsement of the GGFR and the Zero Routine Flaring Initiative show a clear 
commitment towards addressing gas flaring.33 Also, the inclusion of gas flaring reduction as a 
key element of Nigeria’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris 
Agreement shows a strong commitment to reduce gas flaring. Similarly, the adoption of the 
National Gas Policy in 2017 partly shows Nigeria’s commitment to follow through on its 
NDC. As a further demonstration of willingness to act at this time, the PIGB and the National 
Gas Policy provide for the consolidation of the current regulatory agencies in Nigeria’s oil 
and gas sector in order to ease implementation of laws in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. Indeed, 
one of the major problems associated with the regulatory mechanisms for gas flaring 
reduction in Nigeria is the prevailing regulatory overlaps and duplication of functions by 
regulatory agencies. The proposed consolidation of these regulatory agencies is therefore a 
step in the right direction. Be that as it may, the effectiveness and sustainability of the new 
regulatory body will entail developing strong corporate values within the new agency, an 
issue which does not fall within the scope of this thesis. The Nigerian Government has also 
recently adopted the National Gas Flare Commercialization Program in order to meet the gas 
needs of Nigeria, and reduce gas flaring. Basically, although the Nigerian government seems 
to be willing to reduce gas flaring at this time, it cannot rely on its existing laws and ignore 
legislative reforms. The inadequacies of the current law on gas flaring as well as the non-
domestication of international environmental standards on GHG emissions make legislative 
reforms imperative. 
In view of the fact that gas flaring is an issue of serious climatic concern, this thesis explores 
the potential for effectively addressing gas flaring by the domestication of international 
standards on GHG emissions such as the Paris Agreement, to which Nigeria is a party. Gas 
flaring has become a major contributor to climate change as over 16,000 gas flares around the 
globe lead to the release of about 350 million tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.34 
The threats posed by climate change in different parts of the world are so intense that they 
                                                          
33 The GGFR preceded the World Bank’s 2030 Zero Routine Flaring Initiative. The continued gas flaring in 
Nigeria in spite of the GGFR could arguably be attributed to the absence of willingness to adequately address 
gas flaring at the time. However, with the endorsement of the World Bank’s 2030 Zero Routine Flaring 
Initiative in 2015, the Nigerian government has also put in place certain policy measures as a demonstration of 
willingness to meet its commitments under the initiative, and deal with gas flaring. These measures include the 
adoption of the National Gas Policy in 2017 and the establishment of the National Gas Flare Commercialization 
Program (NGFCP) in 2016. 
34 Kieran Cooke, “Waste Gas Flared by Oil Industry Rising, Warns World Bank” (29 October 2016), online:              
<http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/12/29/waste-gas-flared-by-oil-industry-rising-warns-world-bank/>. 
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call for the immediate response of all everywhere.35 It is in recognition of this fact that parties 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reached a 
landmark agreement at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris to 
eliminate climate change and intensify the actions needed for a sustainable low carbon 
future.36 Although Nigeria has ratified the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, it is yet to 
domesticate the Agreement. In the meantime, through the Nigeria Climate Change Policy 
Response and Strategy (NCCPRS), the Federal Government has adopted a climate change 
policy framework which seeks to create an efficient national response to the multi-
dimensional effects of climate change.37 Despite the enactment of this policy, gas flaring 
continues to pose serious challenges partly because the policy is only a course of action 
which is not enforceable. As a result, this thesis envisages the domestication of international 
environmental standards on GHG emissions to which Nigeria is a party as a component of the 
legislative reforms it proposes. The domestication of such standards makes the standards 
enforceable in Nigeria. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Given the abundance of contemporary knowledge including substantive conclusions, and 
theoretical and methodological contributions to the problem of gas flaring in Nigeria, it is 
imperative to analyze scholarly contributions regarding the causes of gas flaring in Nigeria, 
its impacts and potential solutions.  
Several practices38 in the Nigerian oil and gas industry have been identified within scholarly 
literature as contributing to the emission of GHGs.39 Gas flaring, specifically, has become a 
                                                          
35 Oluduro, supra note 4 at 168. 
36 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “The Paris Agreement” online: 
<http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php>. 
37 United Nations Climate Change, “Nigeria’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution” online: 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Nigeria/1/Approved%20Nigeria's%20IN
DC_271115.pdf> at iv [Nigeria’s NDC]. 
38 These practices include the flaring of gas and venting of gas. This research focuses on gas flaring. 
39 Saheed Ismail & Ezaina Umukoro, “Global Impact of gas Flaring” (2012) 4 Energy and Power Engineering at 
291[Ismail and Umukoro]. 
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major contributor to climate change through the release of millions of tons of carbon dioxide 
into the atmosphere.40 Nigeria’s volume of gas flaring is among the highest in the world and 
only a few countries are ahead in terms of billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas flared on a yearly 
basis.41 Ejiogu asserts that until recently, Nigeria had the highest gas flaring rate among the 
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).42 Scholars 
including Nwankwo and Ogagarue posit that Nigeria flared over 70 percent of the gas it 
produced43 and was the second highest flaring country in the world, behind Russia.44 
Although the quantity of gas flared in Nigeria has reduced significantly in recent years, the 
National Gas Policy reveals that Nigeria still flares a substantial amount of its gross natural 
gas production.45 According to the World Bank, Nigeria flares almost 8 billion cubic meters 
of gas annually, and is currently the seventh-largest gas flaring country in the world.46 Over 
ten years ago, Odumosu noted that some flares in the Niger Delta region had burned 
continuously for 40 years.47 
Scholars such as Farina argue that gas flaring is among the most challenging and critical 
environmental and climatic issues the world has had to grapple with in recent times.48 In 
spite of this, there has been some degree of uncertainty regarding the precise amount of gas 
flared worldwide. This may be attributable to the absence of monitoring facilities and 
restricted oversight,49 in addition to the failure on the part of many countries to openly report 
                                                          
40 Ajugwo, supra note 2 at 7. 
41 Snow, supra note 3. 
42 Amanze Ejiogu, “Gas Flaring in Nigeria: Costs and Policy” (2013) 24:6 Energy & Environment at 984 
[Ejiogu]. 
43 Cyril Nwankwo & Difference Ogagarue, “Effects of gas flaring on surface and ground waters in Delta state 
Nigeria” (2011) 3: 5 Journal of Geology and Mining Research at 131–136 [Nwankwo & Ogagarue]. 
44 Ejiogu, supra note 42 at 984. 
45 National Gas Policy, supra note 14 at 61. 
46 The World Bank, “Nigeria’s Flaring Reduction Target: 2020” (March 10, 2017), online: 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/03/10/nigerias-flaring-reduction-target-2020>. 
47 Odumosu 2005, supra note 27 at 2.  
48 Michael Farina. “Flare Gas Reduction: Recent Global Trends and Policy Considerations” (2010), online: 
<http://www.ge-spark.com/spark/resources/whitepapers/Flare_Gas_Reduction.pdf> at 14 [Farina]. 
49 Ibid at 17. 
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volumes of gas flared.50 Nonetheless, the World Bank
 
estimates that about 140 bcms of 
natural gas is flared globally every year.51 Gas flaring occurs due to several reasons. Elvidge 
et al
 
state that gas flaring persists because of the absence of infrastructure necessary for the 
commoditization of the gas.52 With respect to Nigeria, several reasons have been given for 
the continuous flaring of gas. Omiyi
 
suggests that the continuous flaring of gas may be 
attributable to the restricted amount of reservoirs appropriate for gas injection/storage, the 
cost involved in constructing main and inter-connecting gas pipelines linkages, poor 
technological and industrial base for energy use in Nigeria, restricted local and international 
gas market, and insufficient fiscal and gas pricing policies aimed at stimulating 
investments.53 For Farina, several big oil-producing countries have made significant 
advancements in assembling and utilizing their associated gas streams.54 Knetche opines that 
gas flaring may be curtailed by way of market incentives geared towards minimizing cost 
and stimulating innovations.55 
The environmental implications of gas flaring are both local and global. At the local level for 
instance, gas flaring releases a substantial amount of toxins which are the main source of 
acid rain in the Niger Delta. Akobundu writes that the effect of acid rain in the Niger Delta is 
demonstrated by the rusting and caving-in of corrugated iron sheets, destruction of the 
environment, and death of animals.56 The GHGs released by gas flaring also negatively 
                                                          
50 United States Government Accountability Office, “Natural Gas Flaring and Venting: Opportunities to 
Improve Data and Reduce Emissions” (July 2004), online: <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04809.pdf>. 
51 The World Bank, “Natural Gas and Global gas Flaring Reduction” online: 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21032487~pagePK:64257043~piPK:
437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>. 
52 Christopher Elvidge et al, “A Fifteen Year Record of Global Natural Gas Flaring Derived from Satellite Data” 
(2009) 2 Energies at 592. 
53 Basil  Omiyi, “Shell Nigeria Corporate Strategy for Ending Gas Flaring,”(2001) Seminar on Gas Flaring and 
PovertyAlleviation cited in Ikechukwu Diugwu et al, “The Effect of Gas Production, Utilization, and Flaring on 
the Economic Growth of Nigeria” (2013) 4:4 Natural Resources at 347. 
54 Farina, supra note 48 at 15. 
55 See Jack Knetsch, “Environmental Economics, Environmental Law: An Intensive Short Course for 
Practitioners.” (1992) cited in Roger Cotton & Cara Clairman, “The Effect of Environmental Regulation in 
Technological Innovation in Canada” (1995) 21 Canada- U.S. L.J. at 23. It is important to note that the recently 
adopted National Gas Policy seeks to address inter alia, the problem of gas utilization in Nigeria. 
56 Amadi Akobundu. “Impact of Gas Flaring on the Quality of Rain water, Groundwater, and Surface Water in 
Parts of Eastern Niger Delta Nigeria” (2014) 2:3 Journal of Geosciences and Geomatics at 114 – 119 
[Akobundu]. 
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impacts the health of individuals and have been identified as causes of asthma, chronic 
bronchitis, cancer, and blood disorders.57 Ismail and Umukoro argue that globally gas flaring 
releases carbon dioxide which contributes to climate change.58  According to Ana et al, gas 
flaring emits GHG, precursor gases, volatile organic compounds, polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbon, and particulate matter which takes the form of soot.59 These gases do not only 
have grave unfavourable consequences on vegetation, humans and animals but have been 
acknowledged to cause climate change.60 The soot released from the flaring of natural gas is 
essentially black carbon, which plays a significant role in the nature of the earth’s climate 
due to its ability to suck up radiation from the sun and as a result, cause a vertical gradient of 
warming.61 Nordell also lends credence to the assertion that emissions from gas flaring 
contribute to the heating of the earth surface.62  
In recent times, GHG emission which includes carbon dioxide released by gas flares has 
been the subject of research by environmentalists and policymakers and this could be 
attributed to its overwhelming impact on climate change. Scholars such as Ghorbani et al 
argue that GHG emission has contributed to the surge in temperature being experienced all 
over the world.63 It has also led to the melting of ice and the increase in global sea levels, 
thereby exacerbating events such as flooding and tsunamis.64 As indicated by Conway et al, 
proof that the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration has risen during the past decade is 
                                                          
57 Nwankwo & Ogagarue, supra note 43 at 131–136. 
58 Ismail and Umukoro, supra note 39. 
59 Godson Ana, Mynepalli Sridhar&  Godwin Emerole, “Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon Burden in Ambient 
Air in selected Niger Delta communities in Nigeria” (2012) 62:1  J. Air Waste Management Association at 18-
25. 
60 Elisha Dung, Leonard Bombom & Tano Agusomu,“The Effects of Gas Flaring on Crops in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria.” (2008)  73: 4 GeoJournal  at 297 -305. 
61 James McEwen & Matthew Johnson, “Black Carbon Particulate Matter Emission Factors for Buoyancy 
Driven Associated Gas Flares” (2012) 63:3 Journal of Air Waste Management Association at 307-321. 
62 Bo Nordell, “Thermal Pollution causes Global Warming” (2003) 38 Journal of Global and Planetary Change 
at 305–312. 
63 Mohammed Ghorbani, Alizera Koocheki & Marzieh Motallebi, “Estimating the Greenhouse Gases Emission 
and the most important factors in dairy farms (case study of Iran)” (2008) 8 Journal of Applied Sciences  at 
4468–4471. 
64 Ochuko Anomohanran, “Estimating the greenhouse gas emission from petroleum product combustion in 
Nigeria” (2011) 11: 7 Journal of Applied Sciences at 3209–3214. 
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indisputable.65 The reality of climate change has therefore occasioned a variety of multi-
level governance responses to mitigate emissions.66 For instance, the Kyoto Protocol brought 
about measures such as emissions trading, joint implementation and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) for global GHG mitigation. In Europe, the European Union has 
introduced mechanisms such as the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).67 Although responses 
to climate change mitigation have been restricted in the United States, Farber Daniel and 
Peeters Marjan68 point out that California has introduced the ‘cap-and-trade system’ under 
its Global Warming Solutions Act 2006. In addition to the numerous mitigation efforts, 
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
reached a ground-breaking agreement – the Paris Agreement to eradicate climate change and 
increase the actions necessary for a workable low carbon future.69 Stua writes that the Paris 
Agreement was entered into in order to put an end to a period of laxity in international 
climate policy. He further posits that the approach of the Agreement towards GHG emission 
reductions was from a bottom-up perspective enabling all countries to come up with 
mitigation targets through their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC).70 
Although Nigeria has demonstrated its commitment towards climate change mitigation by 
signing the Paris Agreement, Nigeria is yet to enact any law on climate change that could 
also impact the flaring of natural gas. Scholars such as Oluduro argue that while section 20 
of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, includes a provision which 
requires the state to safeguard and improve the environment, and protect the land, water, air, 
                                                          
65 Thomas Conway et al,  “Evidence for Interannual Variability of the Carbon cycle from the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration/Climate Monitoring and Diagnostics Laboratory GlobalAair sampling 
network” (1994) 99 Journal of Geophysical Research at 22831–22855. 
66 Terry Townshend et al, “How National Legislation can Help to Solve Climate Change” (2013) 3 Nature 
Climate Change at 430. 
67 Jonathan Kintzele, “Easy Come, Easy Go: A Guide to California Cap and Trade Spending” (2017) 90 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. at 719. 
68 Farber Daniel & Peeters Marjan, Climate Change Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2016) at 
58 [Daniel & Marjan]. 
69United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, “Summary of the Paris Agreement” online: 
<https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/documents/ece/ces/2016/mtg/Session_1_Bigger_picture_of_COP
21.pdf>. 
70 Michele Stua, From the Paris Agreement to a Low–Carbon Bretton Woods: Rationale for the Establishment 
of a Mitigation Alliance  (Cham: Springer, 2017) at 2. 
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forest and wildlife of Nigeria, the provision is made under the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter II of the Constitution which is not 
enforceable.71 He further argues that the extant environmental laws as well as the 
constitutional provisions on environmental protection, relating to climate change in Nigeria 
are inadequate, especially in comparison with countries such as Ecuador, Dominican 
Republic and Bolivia which have justiciable constitutional provisions on climate change.72 
Although there is currently no climate change law that impacts gas flaring in Nigeria, the 
Nigerian government enacted laws specifically regulating gas flaring, and the oil and gas 
sector as a whole. Omoregbe writes that the Petroleum Ordinance of 1889 and the Mineral 
Regulation (Oil) Ordinance of 1907 established the essential legal structure for the 
development of petroleum resources in Nigeria.73 According to Odumosu, the Petroleum Act 
1969 is the most elaborate piece of legislation on oil and gas exploration and production in 
Nigeria.74 Odumosu further writes that the major legislation regulating gas flaring reduction 
in Nigeria is the AGRA75 which applies to Exclusive Economic Zones and all land as 
defined under the Petroleum Act.76 In examining the feasibility of transferring the Alberta 
regulatory framework for gas flaring reduction to Nigeria, Odumosu makes 
recommendations for developing an effective gas flaring reduction regulatory regime which 
will be appropriate for Nigeria, and outlines transferable concepts in Alberta’s gas flaring 
reduction regime that could be adopted in Nigeria.77 
This thesis contends that the AGRA is inconsistent and ineffective because on the one hand, 
it sets January 1, 1984 as the prohibition date for gas flaring78 and on the other hand, it 
empowers the Minister of Petroleum to use his discretion to permit continued gas flaring in 
                                                          
71 Oluduro, supra note 4 at 170. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Yinka Omorogbe, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (Lagos: Malthouse, 2003) at 16. 
74 Odumosu 2005, supra note 27 at 127. 
75 AGRA, supra note 5. 
76 Odumosu 2005, supra note 27 at 128. 
77 Ibid at 1 – 174. 
78 AGRA, supra note 5 at section 3(1). 
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instances where the target date of January 1, 1984 is not practicable.79 Also, the Act 
empowers the Minister of Petroleum Resources to fix the amount to be paid for every 28.317 
standard cubic metre (SCM) of gas flared.80 Under the Act, the present penalty for gas 
flaring in Nigeria formally stands at a meager $0.03 per 1000 standard cubic feet,81 which 
makes it even more attractive for IOCs not to invest in gas utilization projects. Furthermore, 
as earlier stated, some sections of AGRA have been declared unconstitutional on the grounds 
that they infringe on citizens’ constitutional right to life, as well as healthy and clean 
environment.82 Oluduro advances the argument that eliminating gas flaring requires 
numerous determined efforts by national governments and industry players, including local 
communities and financial institutions.83 It is pertinent to note that other legislation 
applicable to gas flaring reduction was enacted by the government, but they have all been 
unable to adequately nip the issue of gas flaring in the bud. Oluduro writes that some of 
these laws include the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement 
Agency Act 2007 (NESRA Act)84 and the Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA Act).85 
The NESRA Act establishes the National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency (NESREA) and empowers the Agency with the duty inter alia to 
protect the environment, ensure biodiversity conservation, and enforce environmental laws.86 
Also, the EIA Act deals with environmental effects with respect to public and private 
projects in Nigeria. According to Nwoko, the main aim of the EIA is to make sure that 
possible environmental risks are anticipated at the right stage of a project and eliminated in 
advance.87 On a related note, the PIGB which provides a new power and institutional 
                                                          
79 Ibid at 3 (2) a. 
80 Ibid at 3(2) b. 
81  National Gas Policy, supra note 15 at 63. There are indications that the penalty will be increased through the 
new Gas Flaring Regulation. However, the contents of the Regulation have not been made public. Also see  
New Flare Gas Regulations 2018, supra note 32. 
82 See Gbemre v SPDC, supra note 18. 
83 Oluduro, supra note 4 at 169. 
84 National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency Act, 2007, Act No. 25 [NESRA 
Act]. 
85 Environmental Impact Assessment Act No. 86 of 1992, Cap E12 LFN 2004 [EIAA]. 
86 NESRA Act, supra note 84 at section 1 (1) & (2). 
87 Chris Nwoko, “An Evaluation of Environmental Impact Assessment System in Nigeria” (2013) 2: 1Greener 
Journal of Environmental Management and Public Safety at 22 [Nwoko]. 
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structure for the Nigerian petroleum industry has just been passed by the Nigerian 
Parliament,88 but this Bill does not address the issue of gas flaring in Nigeria. 
This thesis contends that the collection of laws on gas flaring in Nigeria has been ineffective. 
One reason for the ineffectiveness of the laws is that gas flaring was not anticipated to 
become an issue of serious climatic distress as at the time the laws were enacted. It is in this 
regard that Oluduro argues that the laws have been unable to meet the fundamental 
requirement which requires a good law to anticipate unforeseen circumstances.89 Oluduro 
explains that the issue of gas flaring in Nigeria may be attributable to the ineffective legal 
framework in place, as well as the unwillingness of the government to enforce its own laws. 
According to Ajugwo, the Nigerian government has failed to effectively implement its 
environmental rules as a result of the intersecting and conflicting jurisdictions of various 
government agencies governing the oil and gas sector.90 He further writes that the non-
transparent governance strategies adopted by some of these agencies have also stifled the 
effective implementation of laws.91 
Apart from the ineffectiveness of the laws on gas flaring in Nigeria, and the lack of 
implementation of the law, another challenge confronting the Nigerian government in its 
effort to reduce the incidence of gas flaring and mitigate GHG emission, is the seeming 
inability to balance the competing foreign investment and environmental protection goals in 
Nigeria.92 Gas flaring in Nigeria can be attributed in part to the oil exploration activities of 
IOCs93 and the inadequate environmental protection measures adopted by the country. As 
noted by Nwanya, gas flaring persists in Nigeria as a result of the absence of social 
responsibility on the part of IOCs towards gas conservation and the inability of the Nigerian 
                                                          
88 PIGB, supra note 25. 
89 Oluduro, supra note 4. 
90 Ajugwo, supra note 2 at 6. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-actor Contracts, Competing Goals and Regulation of Foreign 
Investment” (2014) 65 UNBLJ at 270-311 [Odumosu-Ayanu 2014]. 
93 E.C Ubani & I.M Onyejekwe, “Environmental Impact Analyses of Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta Region of 
Nigeria” (2013) 4(2) Am. J. Sci. Ind. Res., at 246-252. 
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government to strictly enforce its gas flaring rules.94 According to Hermann, while 
developing countries like Nigeria often rely on foreign investors with the expectation of 
improving their local economies, foreign investors on their part are attracted by the 
opportunity to lessen their cost of production through lenient environmental standards in such 
countries.95 Kareem et al write that the Nigerian oil and gas sector is essentially made up of 
IOCs working in joint venture arrangements with the NNPC.96 These IOCs and their 
subsidiaries include Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Chevron, Nigeria Agip 
Oil Company, ExxonMobil, Elf, Total, amongst others.  
Miles argues that the benefits of foreign investment could be enjoyed when there is an 
environmentally responsible framework in place.97 She expresses the view that the 
international investment law system is characterized by excessive emphasis on investment 
protection, an absence of responsibility to curtail the impact of investors’ actions on the 
environment, and the use of the environment in host states to the detriment of the host 
states.98  She adds that BITs often aim at improving foreign participation and making sure 
investments are protected.99 She expresses the view that the problem that is often intrinsic in 
these BITs is the absence of balancing mechanisms such as sustainable development, 
environmental protection and the advancement of public policy.100 In investigating the 
practicability of legislative reforms, this research will also explore and consider the 
applicability of some of these balancing mechanisms to the Nigerian oil and gas sector.  
                                                          
94 Stephen Nwanya, “Climate Change and energy Implications of Gas Flaring in Nigeria” (2011) 6  International 
Journal of low-carbon Technologies at 199. 
95 Douglas Morrin, “People before Profits: Pursuing Corporate Accountability for Labour Rights Violations 
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96 Salami Kareem et al “Foreign direct investment into oil sector and economic growth in Nigeria” (2012) 6:4 
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On a related note, seeing as protection from expropriation is a key protection afforded 
investors in Nigeria, the question that often arises is whether this protection is given in 
disregard of environmental regulation. A look at some of the BITs signed by Nigeria reveals 
that they all have expropriation provisions but do not define expropriation.101 A necessary 
inference to be drawn from Salacuse’s argument is that this lacuna allows the expropriation 
provisions in these BITs to unjustly cover gas flaring regulation since it has bearing on 
foreign investments in Nigeria.102 However, it is arguable whether gas flaring regulation 
amounts to expropriation under Nigerian domestic laws.103 Scholars such as Market opine 
that the incorporation of environmental protection in the preamble of BITs could serve as a 
veritable way to create a balance between investment protection and environmental 
protection.104 Nonetheless, the preamble is generally accepted only as an aid to treaty 
interpretation.105 It is in this regard that Bungenberg, Joern & Hindelang state that since the 
preamble is only a useful aid to interpretation and by no means binding, some arbitral 
tribunals may be inclined to attach little or no weight to it.106  
In addition to incorporating environmental protection in BITS, industry-self regulation could 
complement extant laws in imposing supplementary regulation governing the activities of 
corporations especially as it relates to gas flaring and environmental protection. Nevertheless, 
Gamper-Rabindran & Finger have argued that while corporations may agree to such self-
regulatory measures, they often fail to tackle the underlying environmental issues.107 
                                                          
101 Nigeria- United Kingdom Bilateral Investment Treaty, 11 December 1990 art 5 (entered into force 11 
December 1990); Netherlands – Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty, 2 November 1992 art 6 (entered into force 
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102 See Jeswald Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 293. 
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105 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, art 31 (1) (2) (entered into force 27 January 
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Relatedly, Odumosu-Ayanu proposes the adoption of a multi-actor approach by means of a 
multi-actor (investment) agreement in order to address the competing environmental and 
foreign investment goals amongst local communities and international oil companies.108 She 
expresses the view that a well brokered multi-actor agreement in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector 
will ensure that affected communities in the Niger Delta have recourse under a contract that 
truly acknowledges their rights, and balances competing gas flaring and foreign investment 
goals.109 However, one issue which is often raised is that multi-actor contracts are often 
entered into to protect the interest of the immediate communities likely to be affected by the 
impact of an activity, as opposed to the interest of the general public.110 This research 
therefore argues that in view of the fact that the climatic impact of gas flaring transcends the 
communities’ interests and affects the general public as a whole, statutory environmental 
regulation could continue to operate along with multi-actor contracts. Ultimately, in 
canvassing the central argument of this thesis, which lies in the practicability of adopting 
legislative reforms, this thesis posits that the literature does not seem to adequately address 
the imbalance in the competing foreign investment and environmental protection goals within 
the context of gas flaring regulations in Nigeria. Accordingly, this research will appraise the 
interaction between gas flaring regulation and protection of IOCs within Nigeria’s oil and gas 
sector in addressing this imbalance. It will consider whether Nigeria’s foreign investment 
laws, investments treaties and/or private contractual obligations would prevent the enactment 
or implementation of new gas flaring legislation and if such legislation would impact on 
IOCs. 
In view of the fact that this thesis envisages the domestication of international environmental 
standards on GHG emissions as a component of any reformation of the legal framework for 
gas flaring reduction, the thesis explores the importance of mitigating GHG emissions from 
gas flaring in Nigeria through the domestication of international environmental standards on 
GHG emissions to which Nigeria is a party. Nigeria’s treaties have the force of law only 
when passed into law by the Nigerian legislature.111 Scholars such as Oyebode take the view 
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that a treaty can be transformed into domestic law by either re-enactment or reference.112 
Although Nigeria is a signatory to the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol, Nigeria 
currently has no law on climate change that impacts gas flaring and none of its international 
environmental commitments have been domesticated.   
This research draws from the earlier argument that gas flaring persists partly as a result of 
the nature and ineffectiveness of the current gas flaring law, and proposes the enactment of 
new gas flaring legislation. In fact, Oshionebo argues that the extant legislation on gas 
flaring in Nigeria makes it more economically judicious for IOCs to flare gas into the 
atmosphere.113 The penalty for gas flaring also provides justification for complacency on the 
part of IOCs.114 In this regard, this thesis demonstrates the importance of adopting a pattern 
for enacting laws, hinged on public reasoning and factual evidence with potential for 
effective implementation.115 In the concluding chapter, this thesis puts forward some of the 
insights proposed by ILTAM as a possible tool for designing the legislative reforms. 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology adopted in this research involves an analysis of the international legal 
standards as well as the various laws in Nigeria on gas flaring and foreign investment. By 
analyzing existing legislation and legal frameworks for gas flaring reduction in Nigeria, this 
research identifies legal issues that fetter effective implementation of laws in Nigeria. The 
analysis of existing legislation in Nigeria also aims at ascertaining the extent to which 
existing legislation deals with gas flaring in Nigeria. Considering that the purpose of the 
research is to ascertain the practicability of legislative reforms that aims at gas flaring 
reduction in light of the restrictions placed by international investment law, this thesis also 
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analyzes the framework for international investment law in Nigeria in order to ascertain the 
practicability of legislative reforms. In particular, the thesis analyzes expropriation provisions 
in domestic and international investment laws as well as the stabilization requirements in 
contracts in ascertaining the feasibility of legislative reforms.  
The legal provisions analyzed are obtained from international conventions, statutes, journals 
and online materials. Essentially, this research was accomplished by means of information 
obtained from published materials such as scholarly materials, policy documents, articles, 
newspapers and NGO reports in libraries and the internet.  
1.5 Significance of the Research 
Given the seriousness of the issue of climate change and its impact, the need to respond 
effectively to the GHG emissions associated with gas flaring in Nigeria cannot be over-
emphasized. This research will contribute a legal perspective and provide scholarly insight 
into the growing search for effective ways to respond to the challenge posed by GHG 
emissions from gas flaring. This thesis is of practical importance because it could serve as a 
focal point for the Nigerian government in restructuring its legal framework for gas flaring 
reduction in a manner that creates new gas flaring reduction legislation and domesticates 
some of the relevant international environmental standards on GHG emissions to which 
Nigeria is a party while taking foreign investment goals into account. This thesis also 
contributes to the emerging body of literature that considers legal and regulatory reforms as 
part of the mitigation strategies for GHG emissions from gas flaring in Nigeria.116  
This thesis is divided into four chapters. This first chapter, which is the introductory chapter, 
discusses the scope and relevance of the thesis. Chapter two examines the incidence of gas 
flaring in Nigeria and investigates the effectiveness of the current legal framework for gas 
flaring reduction in Nigeria. The chapter recognizes the need for the enactment of effective 
and implementable gas flaring reduction legislation that addresses the shortcomings of the 
current legislation. It also reflects on the need for legislative reforms and its implications for 
the nature and effectiveness of gas flaring reduction efforts in Nigeria. Having identified 
                                                          
116 See Omoniyi Adewale & Ubale Mustapha, “The Impact of Gas Flaring in Nigeria” (2015) 3:2 International 
Journal of Science, Technology and Society at 40-50.  
23 
 
some of the issues associated with the effectiveness of gas flaring regulation in Nigeria in 
chapter two, chapter three investigates the problem of gas flaring regulation in Nigeria from 
the perspective of the imbalance in Nigeria’s foreign direct investment and environmental 
protection goals. Ultimately, it considers whether Nigeria’s foreign investment laws, 
investment treaties and/or private contractual obligations would restrict the enactment of new 
gas flaring legislation and if such legislation would impact on IOCs engaged in oil production 
activities in Nigeria. Chapter four analyzes the way forward for effective gas flaring 
regulation in Nigeria by arguing for the domestication of international environmental 
standards on GHG emissions to which Nigeria is a party. The chapter proceeds to consider 
the enactment of a new gas flaring law in Nigeria that also recognizes international 
environmental standards and principles and takes foreign investment and economic goals into 
account. In order to achieve these reforms, this thesis presents some of the insights proposed 
by ILTAM as a possible tool for structuring the legislative reforms. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE LAW, REGULATION AND INCIDENCE OF GAS FLARING IN 
NIGERIA 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyzes the legal and regulatory framework for gas flaring reduction in Nigeria. 
It appraises existing legislation as well as regulatory mechanisms for gas flaring reduction in 
Nigeria in order to ascertain the reasons for the continuous flaring of gas in the face of 
existing law.  
Two substantive sections comprise this chapter. The first substantive section examines the 
incidence and regulation of gas flaring in Nigeria. The section also discusses the effects of 
gas flaring in Nigeria and analyzes the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the legal and 
regulatory efforts made by the Nigerian government towards curtailing gas flaring. The 
section highlights the intrinsic deficiencies of the legal and regulatory framework for gas 
flaring reduction. Having discussed the adequacy and effectiveness of gas flaring regulation 
in Nigeria, the second section explores the importance of legislative reforms and reflects on 
its implications for the nature and effectiveness of gas flaring regulation in Nigeria. 
Fundamentally, the section seeks to ascertain whether legislative reforms that focus on 
enacting effective gas flaring reduction legislation and domesticating international 
environmental standards could be justified. 
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2.2 Incidence of Gas Flaring in Nigeria 
2.2.1  Gas Flaring and its Implications in Nigeria 
Over the years, Nigeria’s industrial and economic development has been largely reliant on 
oil.117 Sadly, little attention is paid to the climatic, environmental, health and social problems 
created by the exploration of oil and gas in the Niger Delta region where most of the oil and 
gas exploration activities are carried out.118 Gas flaring, which is the burning of natural gas 
associated with oil and gas production, is one of the most destructive practices in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry that demands urgent attention. According to satellite data, Nigeria flares a 
substantial amount of gas annually, in spite of the fact that about 75 million Nigerians are 
deprived of electricity.119 Gas flaring has continued in Nigeria since the 1950s and 
notwithstanding the legislative efforts and serious energy deficiency faced by Nigerians 
especially as it relates to power generation, it still causes a lot of human and environmental 
challenges in the Niger Delta.120 With about 123 flaring sites in the Niger Delta, Nigeria is 
considered as one of the highest emitters of greenhouse gases in Africa.121  
The continuous flaring of gas in Nigeria may be attributed in part to the absence of a viable 
policy by the Federal Government that sets goals and enunciates plans for the introduction of 
an appropriate framework for the Nigerian gas sector. In addressing this challenge, the 
National Gas Policy 2017 was enacted to “define the policy of the Federal Government in 
respect of Nigeria’s natural gas endowment, establish its medium to long-term targets for gas 
reserves growth and utilization and record strategies to be pursued to ensure the successful 
implementation of the policy in accordance with Nigeria’s national socio-economic 
                                                          
117 Ajugwo, supra note 2 at 6. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Federal Ministry of Environment, “Gas Flare Tracker” online: <http://gasflaretracker.ng/about.html > [FME 
“Gas  Flare Tracker”]. 
121 Onyekachirondi, “Effects of Gas Flaring on the Environment of Host Communities in Niger Delta Region of 
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development priorities”.122 It aims at achieving gas flare out through gas utilization 
projects.123 By means of the policy, the Nigerian government intends to raise the gas flaring 
penalty to a suitable level, enough to de-incentivize the practice of gas flaring, and at the 
same time offering other strategies that will support efficient gas utilization.124 As indicated 
in the preceding chapter, the National Gas Policy articulates the goal of the Nigerian 
Government and sets out an implementation plan for the institution of a suitable legal and 
regulatory structure for the Nigerian gas sector.125 It focuses on exploring and developing 
additional gas supply sources, creating portfolio management framework for cheaper gas 
development, and ascertaining and developing vital gas infrastructure.126 In achieving its 
objective of gas-based industrialization of Nigeria, the National Gas Policy seeks to grow the 
domestic gas market by inter alia, providing alternative markets and uses for gas.127 It seeks 
to build gas market in Nigeria through the identification and encouragement of local gas 
market development projects as well as the development and exploitation of regional African 
gas markets.128 Also, one of the objectives of the National Gas Policy is to take measures to 
ensure that flare capture and utilization projects are created in order to increase flared gas 
utilization.129 
In the meantime, the Nigerian government has commenced a gas flare commercialization 
program in order to effectively curtail the country’s gas flares and increase gas supply in 
order to meet the gas needs of the country. This program is called the National Gas Flare 
Commercialization Program (NGFCP).130 The Nigerian government approved the NGFCP in 
recognition of the fact that flared gas could be exploited to strengthen economic growth, 
propel investments and provide employment opportunities for Nigerians through the 
                                                          
122 National Gas Policy, supra note 14 at 2. 
123 Ibid at 15. 
124 Ibid at 64. 
125 National Gas Policy, supra note 14. 
126 Ibid at 15. 
127 Ibid at 68. 
128 Ibid at 15. 
129 Ibid at 60. 
130 Nigerian Gas Flare Commercialization Programme, “Nigerian Gas Flare Commercialization Programme” 
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utilization of widely accessible technologies.131 The aim of the NGFCP is to put an end to gas 
flaring by means of “technically and commercially viable gas utilization projects” created by 
capable third party investors who will be requested to take part in a competitive and open bid 
process.132 The NGFCP plans to attract investment in economically feasible gas flare capture 
projects.133 Through the program, the Nigerian government will offer flare gas for sale 
through an open bidding process.134 
Earlier gas commercialization policies in Nigeria led to the commencement of projects such 
as the West African Gas Pipeline Project (WAGP), Gas Pipeline Network Expansion, the 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project, and the Escravos Gas Pipeline Projects.135 In 
particular, the WAGP is a regional transmission system constructed to export gas from 
Nigeria to West African countries such as Ghana, Benin and Togo.136 It is the foremost 
regional pipeline to be constructed in sub-Saharan Africa.137 However, this export pipeline 
project is fraught with numerous challenges such as highly expensive infrastructure, lack of 
supply from Nigeria, non-payment by some WAGP consumers, and pipeline vandalism in 
Nigeria.138 In recognition of the shortcomings of the WAGP, the newly adopted National Gas 
Policy provides that the government will take necessary remedial measures to ensure 
improved gas supply into the West African region. As a means to achieve this, the Nigerian 
government intends to ease the business and regulatory environment for the development of 
                                                          
131 Nigerian Gas Flare Commercialization Programme, “Nigerian Gas Flare Commercialization Programme” 
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132 Ibid. 
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gas infrastructure and enlargement of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline.139 These laudable and 
promising initiatives of the Nigerian government are aimed at effective gas utilization.  
As indicated in the preceding chapter, the National Gas Policy addresses insufficient markets 
and infrastructure for natural gas utilization. As a result, this thesis focuses on legislation and 
not on insufficient market and infrastructure. The next section discusses the environmental, 
health, economic and social implications of gas flaring which has persisted in Nigeria despite 
the development of a policy framework. 
2.2.1.1 Environmental Implications  
Gas flaring contributes to climate change with its attendant effects on the environment. The 
flaring of associated gas emits carbon dioxide and a number of compounds such as methane, 
propane, as well as benzene, naphthalene, styrene, acetylene, fluoranthene, anthracene, 
pyrene, xylene and ethylene.140 According to a report by Justice in Nigeria Now, people 
reside within close proximity to the roaring, low-lying flares that spring as high as a 
skyscraper, emitting dark clouds of harmful smoke in the middle of their communities.141 In 
the Northern Hemisphere, gas flaring is a source of a substantial amount of nitrogen dioxide 
and black carbon in the Arctic.142 Nitrogen oxides produce the tropospheric greenhouse gas 
‘ozone’ through photochemical reactions in the atmosphere.143 In the Niger Delta, as in other 
flaring sites, gas flaring releases a substantial amount of toxins which are the main source of 
acid rain. The effect of acid rain in the Niger Delta is demonstrated by the rusting of iron 
sheets and destruction of the ecosystem.144 Acid rain also dissolves and washes away soil 
nutrients leading to a decrease in the nutritional value of crops within the affected area.145 
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The acidification of soil in the affected areas affects capacity for sustainable agriculture, and 
is a major reason for loss of plant fertility.146 This may lead to severe food crisis in Nigeria. 
2.2.1.2 Health Implications 
Gas flaring negatively impacts the health of living organisms. Flares contain toxins such as 
benzene which pollute the air and cause respiratory diseases such as asthma and bronchitis.147 
The harmful pollutants released during incomplete flaring are also linked to diseases such as 
cancer, and deformities in children.148 Toxins released by hydrocarbons affect blood and 
blood-forming cells negatively and could easily lead to anemia (aplastic), pancytopenia and 
leukemia.149 These health impacts occur due to both sour gas flaring and sweet gas flaring. 
Following assertions that the health implications arising from gas flaring are not supported by 
conclusive evidence, a project which seeks to build scientific, statistical and testimonial 
evidence relating to the health impacts of gas flaring in the Niger Delta has just 
commenced.150 
2.2.1.3 Economic Implications 
Nigeria loses billions of dollars yearly to gas flaring. It has been estimated that the total 
volume of flared gas could fuel about 7000MW of efficient thermal electric power.151 In fact, 
the volume of gas flared on a yearly basis in Nigeria is sufficient to take care of the electricity 
requirements of sub–Saharan Africa. Nigeria suffers from insufficient electric power 
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generation despite significant natural gas resources available for power generation. The 
economic implications of the total amount of gas flared in Nigeria are stunning and these 
present investment opportunities in agro-processing facilities, textile plants, and fertilizer 
plants with potentials for job creation.152. In this regard, Ismail and Umukoro suggest that 
more gas-intensive modes of production should be employed in the oil and gas sector.153 
2.2.1.4 Social Implications 
The social impact of gas flaring in the Niger Delta region is far-reaching and has affected the 
social and cultural lives of the communities in the region.154 For instance, gas flaring has 
resulted in the extinction of medicinal plants and herbs that are of great significance to the 
traditional medicine and spirituality of the region, and some of these herbs are found in 
forests and swamps which have been rendered toxic by gas flares.155 Under the Petroleum 
(Drilling and Production) Regulation, a licensee of an oil mining lease is precluded from 
exercising its mining lease where, amongst others, the land is a sacred forest.156 However, 
this provision of the law is often breached by IOCs by operating and flaring gas in such 
designated areas.157  
Amongst the Niger Delta communities, the negative effects of oil and gas production have 
fostered individualism as opposed to the hitherto communal lifestyle.158 In times of pollution, 
the elders of the communities think of themselves first and collaborate with the IOCs at the 
                                                          
152 Ibid. 
153 Ismail and Umukoro, supra note 39 at 293. 
154 Legborsi Pyagbara, “The Adverse Impacts of Oil Pollution on the Enviroment and Wellbeing of a Local 
Indigenous Community:The Experience of the Ogoni People of Nigeria” (Paper delivered at the United Nations 
International Expert Group Meeting on Indigenous Peoples and Protecion of the Environment, 27-29 August 
2007) at 11 online: <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/workshop_IPPE_pyagbara.doc.> 
[Legborsi].  
155 Ibid. 
156 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, supra note 21 at paragraph 17. 
157  Legborsi, supra note 154. 
158 Ibid. 
31 
 
expense of their status in the community thereby breaking the social harmony that was 
formerly in place.159  
In view of the health, social, and environmental implications of gas flaring discussed above, 
this thesis contends that the adverse effects of gas flaring have now made it expedient for 
Nigeria to be more determined than ever to curtail the incidence of gas flaring. The next 
section assesses the adequacy of the efforts made by the Nigerian government at developing a 
legislative and regulatory framework for oil exploration and production and gas flaring 
reduction in Nigeria. The section analyzes the AGRA which is the current domestic gas 
flaring law in Nigeria, and appraises the various regulatory agencies such as the Department 
of Petroleum Resources (DPR), the National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency (NESREA), and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDRA).  
2.2.2 The Law 
2.2.2.1 Associated Gas Re-injection Act (AGRA) 
Currently, the principal legislation regulating gas flaring reduction in Nigeria is the AGRA160 
and the regulations made pursuant to the Act.161 The application of the AGRA extends to all 
lands as defined under the Petroleum Act and the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)162 but 
does not extend to non-associated gas within concession or contract zones.163 Notably, the 
Act prohibits the flaring of associated gas after January 1 1984, without the written consent of 
the Minister.164 However, it allows the Minister to use his discretion to permit continued gas 
flaring in instances where the target date of January 1, 1984 is not tenable.165 The Regulations 
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made under the AGRA provide for conditions for the exercise of the Minister’s power to 
issue a certificate pursuant to section 3(2) of the AGRA for the continued flaring of gas in a 
specific field(s).166 These conditions include where over 75 percent of the produced gas was 
effectively utilized or conserved; where the produced gas contains 15 percent of certain 
impurities which makes the gas unsuitable for industrial purposes; where an on-going 
utilization program was disrupted by equipment failure provided that such failure is not 
deemed frequent by the Minister and the duration of anyone disruption does not exceed three 
months; and where the ratio of the amount of gas produced per day to the distance of field 
from the closest  gas line or possible utilization point is less than 50,000 standard cubic feet 
per kilometer as long as the gas-to-oil ratio of the field is less than 3,500 standard cubic feet 
per barrel, and that it is not technically appropriate to re-inject the gas in that field.167 The 
Minister may also in appropriate cases, as he may deem fit, order the production of oil from a 
field that does not meet any of these conditions.168 
2.2.2.2 Inadequacies of the Associated Gas Re-injection Act (AGRA) 
Notwithstanding the promising provisions of the AGRA and its regulations, the overall utility 
and effectiveness of the legislation and its regulations are limited by several factors. First, the 
Regulations confer enormous discretion on the Minister to modify any provision of the 
Regulations as he/she may deem fit.169 The effect of this is that the Minister could amend, 
alter, or add to the provisions of the regulations in order to permit the flaring of gas by IOCs 
based on some lenient conditions. In fact, the Minister has often used his/her discretion to 
grant permits for the flaring of gas in a manner that favours the IOCs.170  
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Second, the penalty regime under the AGRA provides justification for complacency on the 
part of IOCs and encourages the continuous flaring of gas in Nigeria.171 Under the AGRA, 
the Minister determines the amount to be paid for every 28.317 standard cubic metre (SCM) 
of gas flared,172 which is equivalent to 1000 standard cubic feet. At the moment, IOCs pay 10 
naira (US $ 0.03)173 per thousand standard cubic feet (MCF) as penalty for flaring gas even 
though gas is sold at the international gas market for US $ 2.73 per MCF.174 The penalty is 
not significant enough to dissuade IOCs from flaring gas in Nigeria.  
Third, the provisions of the AGRA are not based on broader environmental principles such as 
sustainable development and polluter pays principle. As indicated in the preceding chapter, 
the AGRA is outdated and was enacted at a time when gas flaring was not envisioned to 
impact the climate as it now does. It is also instructive to note that the paltry sum paid by the 
IOCs represents a misapplication of the polluter pays principle. The polluter pays principle 
addresses the compensatory cost of damage to the property rights of those affected by the 
environmental pollution caused by the polluter.175 However, it is apparent that the meager 
sum paid by IOCs as penalties does not adequately compensate for the effects of gas flaring, 
and this significantly undermines the effectiveness of the law. Legislation informed by 
environmental considerations such as sustainable development and polluter pays principle 
may be better able to adopt measures to address gas flaring. Basically the AGRA lacks an 
environmental perspective to gas flaring reduction. It is partly for this reason that the 
Nigerian government cannot rely on the AGRA in its present form. 
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Fourth, the meager fees paid by the IOCs as penalty for flaring gas in Nigeria are considered 
as allowable deductions for purposes of payment of petroleum profit tax by IOCs.176 This was 
the decision of the Tax Appeal Tribunal (TAT) in Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited 
(MPNU) v Federal Inland Revenue Service, where the Tribunal held in favour of MPNU and 
allowed the gas flare penalty paid by MPNU in the course of its petroleum operations as tax 
deductible.177 Although it could be argued that this decision is a major boost for foreign 
investors in Nigeria,178 it nonetheless, tacitly encourages the continuous flaring of gas by 
IOCs. The decision of the TAT is hinged on the fact that the AGRA treats the penalty for gas 
flaring as ‘royalties’, and subjects the same to a similar procedure as ‘royalties’ to the Federal 
Government by IOCs.179 The problem lies in the fact the Petroleum Profit Tax Act,180 which 
regulates the assessment and collection of petroleum profits in Nigeria, considers such 
royalties under the AGRA, as tax deductible.181 The legislative reforms that this thesis 
proposes will not treat penalties as ‘royalties’ for purposes of tax deduction. 
Fifth, the ineffectiveness of the AGRA could possibly be attributed, in part, to the absence of 
a mechanism that monitors the efficacy of the Act and justifies its substance. The evidence-
based ILTAM guide considered in this thesis, for instance, requires that in order to create an 
effective and enforceable gas flaring reduction law hinged on facts, the Nigerian lawmaker 
could accompany a gas flaring legislation with a research report that justifies the substance of 
the bill. The absence of this mechanism envisaged by ILTAM could possibly have 
undermined the effectiveness of the AGRA in inducing its specified behaviour and 
effectively addressing its targeted social problem. This deficiency partly provides the impetus 
for this thesis’ consideration of legislative reform that envisions the enactment of a new gas 
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flaring legislation that is based on factual evidence and public reasoning with capacity for 
effective enforcement. 
In further buttressing the inadequacy of the AGRA, it is important to note that the validity of 
the legislation was tested by the Court in Jonah Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria Limited.182 In that case, the Federal High Court held that section 3(2) (a) 
(b) of the Act, and section 1 of its Regulations under which continued flaring of gas in 
Nigeria may be permitted are inconsistent with the rights to life and/or dignity of human 
persons enshrined in the constitution,183 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act,184 and are therefore unconstitutional, and null and 
void. In spite of this judgment which further demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the 
legislation, the AGRA continues to serve as the substantive gas flaring law in Nigeria.185  
As a result of the inadequacy of the AGRA, subsequent attempts have been made towards 
amending the AGRA. In 2008, a Bill was brought before the National Assembly seeking to 
extend the deadline for gas flaring to December 31, 2008, and permitting gas flaring on the 
condition that the oil company pays the sum of 410.00 naira per MCF as penalty for flaring 
gas.186 This Bill was eventually rejected by the National Assembly.187 In the same vein, 
another Bill, the Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2008 was also brought before 
the National Assembly in 2008, but was never signed into law.188 This Bill sought to impose 
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a penalty for gas flaring by introducing a punishment of fine not less than the cost of gas at 
the international gas market.189 Under this Bill, the Minister could permit the flaring of gas 
only in cases of start-up, shut down or failure of equipment.190 The Bill proposed the 
complete prohibition of gas flaring in Nigeria and extended the effective date to December 
31, 2008.191 Despite the laudable provisions of this Bill, it was not passed into law at the 
time, and as it stands, the AGRA remains the extant law on gas flaring reduction in Nigeria. 
Other environmental laws such as the Petroleum Act of 1969 have been unable to address the 
problem of gas flaring. As discussed in the previous chapter also, the PIGB has recently been 
passed by both houses of the Nigerian National Assembly, but is yet to be signed into law. 
However, the PIGB does not make any specific provision regarding gas flaring.192 
Nonetheless, the PIGB demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Nigerian government to 
address issues confronting Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. The enactment of the PIGB as well as 
the adoption of the National Gas Policy and the NGPCP shows that the Nigerian government 
is willing, at this moment, to reform the oil and gas sector. In particular, the National Gas 
Policy and NGFCP aim at ending gas flaring and achieving gas flare out through gas 
utilization projects. 
2.2.3 The Regulatory Mechanisms and their Limitations 
Various institutions have been established to regulate oil and gas production in Nigeria. 
However, with respect to gas flaring, the function of gas flaring regulation has continued to 
teeter between the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), Nigerian 
Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA), and the 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR). In describing the roles of these regulatory 
agencies, this section will also identify the restrictions to the agencies’ performance of their 
roles that impact effective gas flaring regulation in Nigeria. 
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2.2.3.1 Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
Basically, the role of the DPR is to ensure compliance with petroleum laws and regulations in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas sector.193 The DPR also regulates the petroleum industry activities to 
ensure that they are in consonance with national goals and objectives including goals 
pertaining to flare down and domestic gas supply obligations.194  It is the technical arm of the 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources.195  
The primary functions of the DPR include regulating all petroleum industry activities which 
are undertaken under licenses and leases in Nigeria so as to ensure compliance with the 
relevant laws and regulations. The DPR also implements safety and environmental rules and 
makes sure that petroleum activities meet national and international industry standards. It 
maintains records on petroleum industry activities, especially on issues pertaining to 
petroleum reserves, exploration and export of crude oil, gas and condensate, licenses and 
leases, and provides regular updates on the petroleum industry activities to the Government. 
In addition, the DPR advises the Government and relevant agencies on technical matters and 
policies which may have impact on the governance and control of petroleum, and processes 
all applications for licenses in order to ensure compliance with stipulated guidelines before 
making suggestions to the Minister of Petroleum Resources. The DPR also ensures timeous 
and accurate payment of rents and royalties due to the Nigerian government.196 
The DPR derives its powers by delegation from the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation Act which creates the Petroleum Inspectorate as an essential part of the 
NNPC.197 Neither the AGRA nor the Petroleum Act grants an explicit regulatory mandate to 
                                                          
193 Department of Petroleum Resources, “Functions” online: < https://www.dpr.gov.ng/functions-of-dpr/> [DPR 
Functions]. 
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the DPR.198 Rather, the duty to enforce their provisions is vested in the Minister who carries 
out this function through the DPR.199 Accordingly, the implementation structures and the 
responsibilities of DPR are imprecise and this undermines the effective implementation of 
gas flaring laws by the DPR. 
2.2.3.2 National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency 
(NESREA) 
NESREA was created with the mandate to ensure the safeguarding and development of the 
environment, biodiversity protection and improvement of Nigeria’s natural resources and 
environmental technology.200 Its role includes partnering with relevant stakeholders on issues 
involving the implementation of environmental standards.201 NESREA is currently the 
principal environmental regulatory body in Nigeria.202 NESREA replaced the defunct Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) as a result of the shortcomings of the FEPA which 
include lack of implementation of existing environmental laws.203 Scholars assert that 
NESREA represents a new vista for environmental protection in Nigeria because in both its 
aims and content, it seeks to address the prevalence of old environmental regulations and 
implementation mechanisms which led to the increase in the non-compliance rate with 
environmental laws.204 The law creating NESREA empowers the Agency to inter alia ensure 
compliance with the provisions of international environmental standards on the 
environment.205 Since most of the international environmental standards to which Nigeria is 
                                                          
198 Odumosu 2005, supra note 27 at 147. 
199 Ibid at 146. 
200 National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA), “Our Functions” 
online: <http://www.nesrea.gov.ng/our-functions/>. 
201 Ibid. 
202 NESREA Act, supra note 84. 
203 Mohammed Ladan, “Review of NESREA Act 2007 and Regulations 2009-2011: A New Dawn in 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in Nigeria” online: < 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272290396_Review_of_NESREA_Act_2007_and_Regulations_2009-
2011_A_New_Dawn_in_Environmental_Compliance_and_Enforcement_in_Nigeria>  at  120 [Ladan]. 
204 Ibid at 121. 
205 NESREA Act, supra note 84 at section 7 (c).  
39 
 
signatory have not been domesticated, it could be argued that the law creating the NESREA 
restricts the implementation power of NESREA only to the treaties which have been 
domesticated. However, many of the environmental law treaties that implicate gas flaring 
reduction are yet to be domesticated. It remains the contention of this thesis therefore that 
Nigeria has an obligation to domesticate its international treaties to ensure effective 
implementation of its environmental law standards including those restricting GHG emissions 
from gas flaring. 
2.2.3.3 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) 
The NOSDRA was created in 2006 with the mandate for readiness, identification and 
reaction to oil spillages in Nigeria.206 It is apparent that the objective of the law establishing 
the NOSDRA is to limit its responsibility to incidences of oil spillage. The guiding principles 
of the Agency are to fashion, foster and support a zero tolerance for oil spill incident in the 
Nigerian environment.207 There have however been calls for the expansion of the law 
establishing the Agency to include responsibilities for other types of environmental pollution. 
One may argue that this expansion of roles will be necessary in order to accommodate 
responsibilities for implementing and monitoring gas flaring laws. Nonetheless, it is doubtful 
if a proliferation of regulatory agencies will be helpful in reducing the incidence of gas 
flaring in Nigeria. In the meantime, NOSDRA still plays a key role in gas flaring regulation 
in Nigeria. The Agency has established a gas flaring tracking system which is aimed at aiding 
regulators in detecting the volume of gas flared by oil companies operating in Nigeria.208 The 
system is funded by the United Kingdom through its Department for International 
Development (DFID).209 As laudable as this innovation may seem, this thesis contends that 
there is a need to amend the law in order to provide a legal basis for the gas flaring tracking 
system, considering the fact that the Agency’s objective as stated in its enabling law, is 
limited to oil spillage. 
                                                          
206 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (Establishment) Act No.15 2006 at section 1(1). 
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2.2.3.4 World Bank Initiatives 
Through initiatives such as the Zero Routine Flaring by 2030, the World Bank has been 
making efforts to stop the incidence of gas flaring as it contributes to climate change and 
impacts the environment through emission of hazardous pollutants. The Zero Routine Flaring 
by 2030 initiative was introduced by the World Bank to bring together governments, oil 
companies, and development institutions who recognize that gas flaring is unsustainable from 
a resource management and environmental perspective, and who agree to cooperate to 
eliminate routine flaring no later than 2030.210 This initiative does not address gas flaring for 
safety reasons or non-routine flaring. The initiative seeks to encourage the proper 
environment of cooperation between all stakeholders in order to bring about economic 
solutions through appropriate regulation, application of technologies, and financial 
arrangements, and strengthens the notion that governments, oil companies, and institutions all 
need to work in consonance to eradicate routine flaring.211 
The initiative is beneficial to both endorsing governments and endorsing oil companies. The 
endorsing governments are required to provide a legal, regulatory, investment and operating 
environment that is conducive to upstream investments and to the growth of viable markets 
for utilization of the gas and the infrastructure needed to provide gas to these markets.212 This 
will in turn give the endorsing companies confidence and incentivize them for investing in 
flare elimination ventures.213 While the endorsing companies make a commitment to avoid 
routine flaring in new oil field developments, and make efforts to end ongoing routine flaring 
over time, the endorsing countries, in addition, make a commitment to provide an operating 
environment conducive for flaring reduction.214 Currently, 22 governments (including 
Nigeria), 29 oil and gas companies and 13 development institutions have endorsed the 
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initiative.215 Commendably, the Nigerian government is determined to end gas flaring ahead 
of the Zero Routine Flaring initiative by achieving gas flare-out through gas utilization.216 To 
this end, the Federal Government has designed a National Gas Policy and the NGFCP.217 
This is a commendable proactive policy measure which places Nigeria in a very good 
position to meet the World Bank’s 2030 target. A restructuring of the legal framework for gas 
flaring reduction and domestication of international environmental standards proposed in this 
thesis also present viable options that support realization of the target. 
The World Bank had earlier launched the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR), 
a public-private initiative made up of local and international oil companies, government, and 
international bodies. This initiative is aimed at increasing the consumption of natural gas 
associated with oil production by facilitating the removal of technical and regulatory hurdles 
to flaring reduction, conducting research, spreading best practices, and evolving country-
specific gas flaring reduction programmes.218 Countries such as Canada, via the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), have provided substantial backing to the World 
Bank with respect to this initiative.219 The GGFR has continued to provide assistance to 
Nigeria in achieving its goal of ending routine gas flaring and unlocking Nigeria’s substantial 
gas potential.220 Overall, the GGFR and Zero Routine Flaring initiative are part of the global 
initiatives put in place by the World Bank towards reducing gas flaring. Nigeria has also 
made efforts to give effect to GGFR through fiscal and economic incentives, international 
initiatives, as well as the National Gas Policy and the NGFCP, which refers specifically to the 
GGFR. As earlier indicated in the preceding chapter, the initiative sets clear gas flaring 
reduction goals for the future. It is different from the GGFR which is earlier in time, as the 
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GGFR’s aim is not to set such goals, but to aid flaring mitigation activities in order to meet 
the 2030 goal. Nigeria’s adoption of the GGFR and Zero Routine Flaring initiative further 
demonstrates the commitment of the government at this moment to taking steps in reducing 
gas flaring. There is an indication that Nigerian government is willing to adopt a legislative 
response to gas flaring at the moment. 221 
2.3 The Need for Legislative Reforms and its Implications for the Nature and 
Effectiveness of Gas Flaring Reduction in Nigeria 
The preceding sections have presented the inadequacies of the law as well as regulatory 
challenges as part of the factors inhibiting gas flaring reduction efforts in Nigeria. It is against 
this background that this thesis considers the importance of legislative reforms in curtailing 
the incidence of gas flaring in Nigeria. As earlier indicated in chapter one, the legislative 
reforms which this thesis envisages are twofold. It contemplates the adoption of new gas 
flaring reduction legislation and the domestication of international standards on GHG 
emissions. 
In canvassing the argument for legislative reforms, this thesis contends that the current gas 
flaring legislation in Nigeria has been ineffective. As earlier indicated, one reason for the 
ineffectiveness of the legislation is that gas flaring was not envisioned to seriously impact the 
climate at the time the law was enacted. Basically, the Nigerian government was unable to 
know in advance, the capacity of gas flaring to cause serious climate concern as it presently 
is, and, was unable to effectively predict in advance how to respond adequately to the issue of 
gas flaring. The principal gas flaring law in Nigeria, the AGRA, has been unable to meet the 
fundamental requirement which requires a good law to anticipate unforeseen 
circumstances.222 It is clear that the AGRA was enacted at a time when environmental 
principles such as sustainable development had not gained as much prominence as they now 
have. Similarly, as indicated earlier, the AGRA is deficient as it has been unable to induce its 
specified behaviour and properly address its targeted social problem. Also, the Minister of 
Petroleum still relies on the outdated and ineffective AGRA in its present form, despite its 
inability to properly address the climatic, environmental, health and social concerns arising 
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from the flaring of natural gas in Nigeria. Although Nigeria now has a gas flaring tracking 
mechanism that monitors the volume of gas flared,223 a lot remains to be done to properly 
tackle the incidence of gas flaring. The passage of the PIGB is a step in the right direction but 
as highlighted earlier, the PIGB does not address the problem of gas flaring. In order to 
curtail the incidence of gas flaring, introducing new legislation hinged on environmental 
considerations could prove an effective alternative to the current legislation. 
Furthermore, legislative reforms are imperative in view of the fact that the ability of the 
Nigerian government to meet the targets set in its gas flaring reduction policies could be 
dependent on the enactment of new legislation. For instance, as earlier indicated, the National 
Gas Policy has been adopted by the Nigerian government to inter alia achieve gas flare-out in 
Nigeria through gas utilization. Gas utilization could be encouraged by disincentivizing gas 
flaring. This could dissuade IOCs from flaring gas, thereby inducing them to focus on gas 
utilization. The legislative reforms proposed in this thesis seek to give effect to the objective 
of the National Gas policy by inter alia disincentivizing gas flaring and encouraging gas 
utilization.  
 
In addition, given that gas flaring contributes to climate change through the emission of 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, Nigeria’s commitment towards ending gas flaring will be 
bolstered if it carries out legislative reform that domesticates international environmental 
standards on GHG emissions to which it is a party. As indicated earlier, despite ratifying the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change, Nigeria is yet to domesticate the Agreement. The 
domestication of the Agreement will ensure that Nigeria’s obligations under its NDCs are 
enforceable in Nigeria. It will also enable subsequent legislation to make reference to those 
domesticated standards. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Given that the broader inquiry in this thesis is to explore the practicability of adopting 
legislative reforms in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector as a solution to the problem of gas flaring 
in Nigeria, the chapter has analyzed the incidence of gas flaring in Nigeria and discussed the 
ineffectiveness of the legal framework for gas flaring reduction in Nigeria.  In making a case 
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for legislative reforms, the chapter discussed the legal measures Nigeria has taken to reduce 
the climatic and environmental impact of gas flaring and argued that the current gas flaring 
reduction regime has been ineffective.  The chapter provided the basis for contending that the 
domestication of international environmental standards on GHG emissions and incorporation 
of environmental principles in legislation could serve to ensure greater effectiveness of the 
gas flaring reduction efforts in Nigeria. It also identified the lack of effective implementation 
of laws as well as the duplication of functions among regulatory agencies as one of the 
factors hampering gas flaring reduction in Nigeria. This chapter has provided the premise for 
this thesis’ consideration of legislative reforms as a viable option for curtailing the incidence 
of gas flaring in Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER 3: PRACTICABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE REFORMS:  EXAMINING THE 
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT STANDARDS ON GAS 
FLARING REGULATION IN NIGERIA 
3.1  Introduction 
The preceding chapter has laid out the premise for this thesis’ consideration of legislative 
reforms as a possible option for reducing gas flaring in Nigeria. This chapter will examine the 
practicability of legislative reforms and investigate whether Nigeria’s foreign investment 
laws, investment treaties and contractual obligations would preclude the enactment of new 
gas flaring legislation. In investigating the practicability of legislative reforms, this chapter 
scrutinizes the regulatory framework for international investment law in Nigeria and its 
potential impacts on gas flaring in Nigeria. The chapter places specific environmental issues 
with respect to Nigeria’s oil and gas industry within the context of the criticisms of 
international investment law and addresses the recurring incidence of gas flaring. This thesis 
recognizes the relevance of other treatment standards in BITs such as national treatment and 
fair and equitable treatment but will focus on expropriation.224 It argues that expropriation is 
most likely to impact domestic gas flaring regulation in Nigeria.  
Four substantive sections comprise this chapter. The first substantive section of this chapter 
investigates foreign investment and global investment trends and discusses pertinent issues 
regarding foreign investment in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. The second section discusses 
liberalization and demonstrates that even though foreign investment has contributed 
immensely to the growth of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector, the sector remains the major emitter 
of GHGs from gas flaring in Nigeria. The third section appraises Nigerian law on foreign 
investment protection, specifically focusing on the Nigeria Investment Promotion 
Commission Act (NIPCA)225 and Nigeria’s BITs. The fourth section analyzes 
environmentally relevant clauses in oil and gas contracts and examines whether stabilization 
clauses in oil and gas contracts would preclude the enactment of new gas flaring legislation. 
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3.2 Foreign Investment And Global Investment Trends  
The impact of foreign investment and global investment trends on the oil and gas sector 
cannot be overemphasized.226 Foreign investment has been a subject of global debate227 and 
has assisted in developing the economies of the global south in areas such as education, 
health, infrastructure, and oil and gas.228 Economic theory has shown that foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has a positive impact on the economies of countries in the global south.229 
However, foreign investment is not without challenges. For example, Gallagher and Zarsky 
express the view that FDI usually gives rise to the displacement of local firms, thereby 
undermining market competition and resulting in inflated prices.230 Be that as it may, foreign 
investment in the oil and gas sector has contributed significantly to the gross domestic 
product of sub-Saharan countries, including Nigeria.231 It is not only an indicator of 
globalization, but triggers its deepening. International investments play a key role in the 
economic and political aspects of globalization as investors and traders are recognized as 
active players in the globalization process. According to the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), global investment is experiencing a modest recovery as 
global investment flows increased to about $USD1.8 trillion in 2017 and will continue to 
                                                          
226 Within the context of this thesis, foreign investment refers to “the transfer of tangible or intangible assets 
from one country into another for the purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth under the total or 
partial control of the owner of the assets”. It also refers to “a transfer of funds or materials from one country 
(called capital exporting country) to another country (called host country) in return for a direct or indirect 
participation in the earnings of that enterprise”. See Muthucumaswa Sornarajah, The International Law on 
Foreign Investment, 2nd ed (Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 7 [Sornarajah]. 
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increase to about $USD1.85 trillion in 2018.232 It is also projected that FDI to Africa will 
improve with a significant rise in oil prices and improvements in regional integration.233 This 
forecast connotes a potential increase in oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta and the 
attendant flaring of gas in the region by IOCs. The increasing number of IOCs operating in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas sector demonstrates the impact of FDI in the sector. 
3.3 Liberalization 
As earlier stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, Nigeria is yet to adequately tackle 
the incidence of gas flaring as a result of several reasons including the priority given to 
investment liberalization and investment protection over environmental protection. This 
emphasis on investment liberalization has resulted in a situation of imbalance between 
Nigeria’s right to regulate its environment, including gas flaring regulation, and the right of 
the IOCs to guaranteed protection under Nigeria’s investment laws, contracts and customary 
international law. Schram expresses the view that although improved trade and investment 
amongst nations could trigger economic development, reduce poverty and its effects, and 
stimulate investments and increase access to goods and technologies, investment 
liberalization comes with some potential risks.234 One of such risks in Nigeria is that gas 
flaring caused by IOCs in the Niger Delta will continue in the absence of legislative reforms 
among others. Within the context of this thesis, liberalization implies the removal of 
government controls.235    
Although liberalization comes with a lot of practical and theoretical unpredictability, several 
countries in the global south have embraced it.236 Generally, the volume of Regional Trade 
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Agreements (RTA) around the world has increased over the years, and the range of 
contemporary RTAs now includes FDI and investment liberalization for foreign investors.237 
For example, in South East Asia, the Association of South East Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) 
Investment Guarantee Agreement (AIGA) was signed to offer a legal structure for the 
protection of investors, provide acceptable compensation for expropriation as well as an 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.238 However, the ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement (ACIA) which has recently been signed seeks to reduce foreign-
ownership restrictions in a number of industries with the ASEAN member countries.239 
Regional integration like this aims to decrease investment costs for foreign investors in 
partner countries but such goodwill does not extend to non-partner countries.240 Most RTAs 
contain clauses which make provisions that reconcile the agreements with multilateral or 
other environmental agreements.241 The benefits of environmental provisions in RTAs 
include bolstering enforcement of environmental laws including the legislative reforms that 
this thesis envisages, and increasing environmental principles.242 
As regards Africa, regional integration aimed at liberalization goes beyond trade and market 
integration and entails getting larger regional markets and more resourceful production 
systems aimed at improving Africa’s competitiveness and positioning the continent to attract 
a bigger share of the global market.243 The signing of the Treaty Establishing the African 
Economic Community in 1991244 and its coming into force in 1994 confirmed the 
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commitment of African countries to create an African Economic Community. With respect to 
West Africa, the development of a regional trade agreement for the Economic Community of 
West Africa States (ECOWAS) will raise Nigeria’s negotiating power, as such negotiation 
will be done jointly with other ECOWAS countries.245 As the giant of Africa, Nigeria can 
play a key role in developing an RTA restricted to ECOWAS member states.  Although most 
of the IOCs operating in Nigeria are not from countries within the ECOWAS region, an 
ECOWAS-based RTA could nonetheless be relevant in strengthening co-operation in 
environmental issues of shared interest amongst member countries such as gas flaring. This 
RTA could contain provisions requiring parties to implement their laws and regulations as 
well as provisions requiring parties not to undermine their environmental laws in order to 
attract investment.  
3.4 Nigerian Law on Foreign Investment Protection 
Nigerian lawmakers have increased their drive to enact laws that will stimulate and protect 
foreign investment in Nigeria since the mid-1980s.246 The economic deprivation experienced 
as a result of the nationalization programmes of countries in the global south partly 
necessitated the Nigerian government’s adoption of the liberalization agenda.247  
The enactment of the NIPCA and the numerous BITs signed by Nigeria were both the 
outcome of the Nigerian government’s liberalization agenda. Although foreign investment 
has contributed significantly to the growth of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector, the sector remains 
the major emitter of hazardous substances into the environment in Nigeria. This is evidenced 
inter alia, in the incessant flaring of gas, which has continued as a result of the emphasis of 
the Nigerian government on the sustenance of the revenue being generated from the IOCs 
operating in the sector, without having due regard to the effect of the continuous flaring of 
gas on the environment. This strengthens the call for legislative reforms aimed at gas flaring 
reduction as an important step that must be undertaken by the Nigerian government. In 
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examining the practicability of legislative reform, this section will consider the NIPCA and 
Nigeria’s BITs and ascertain whether they could hinder legislative reforms in Nigeria’s oil 
and gas sector. 
3.4.1 The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act (NIPCA) 
 
The NIPCA is the main legislation regulating foreign investment in Nigeria and its objectives 
include the encouragement of both local and foreign investments.248 With an objective of 
liberal and open door policy to investments, the Act was enacted, following the shift in the 
economic policy of the Nigerian government from indigenization to liberalization in order to 
strengthen Nigeria’s image at the international level.249 
The most important characteristic of the Act is that it allows for full equity participation in 
any enterprise in Nigeria and this is a significant departure from the earlier 40% equity 
participation required by the government’s indigenization policy.250 The Act also makes 
provision for guarantees and incentives such as guarantee against expropriation, dispute 
settlement mechanisms,251 transfer of capital, profits and dividend guarantees,252 right of 
access to court and due process.253  The guarantee against expropriation provided under the 
Act is worthy of consideration as it could impact gas flaring regulation. 
3.4.1.1 Nationalization And Expropriation 
Although expropriation and nationalization are comparable, it is important to differentiate the 
terms.254 Generally, while nationalization cuts across an industry, expropriation aims at a 
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particular business.255 Nationalization refers to a situation where a host state indulges in an 
indiscriminate taking of property of investors with the aim of putting an end to their 
economic control and dominance of the economy or sectors of the economy.256 One 
important feature of this method of taking is that it impacts a sector of the economy or the 
economy at large.257 Expropriation is a forceful taking by the Government of tangible or 
intangible property owned by private persons by way of an administrative or legislative 
action.258 Scholars such as Ekwueme assert that expropriation covers situations where 
administrative or legislative actions transfer assets to third parties different from the 
expropriating state or where such administrative or legislative actions deprive persons of their 
ownership over assets, without transferring the assets to the government or third parties.259 
Basically, expropriation can be classified as direct or indirect.  Direct expropriation is easily 
identifiable and entails an open or noticeable government taking of a foreign investment.260 In 
other words, it is an intentional and unconcealed taking of foreign-owned facilities or 
mandating a compulsory transfer of title.261 Indirect expropriation is an interference with an 
asset that, while detrimental, does not amount to an actual transfer of title.262 It is a drastic 
interference with an investor’s use of their property to the extent that their ability to make 
profit is acutely eroded even though ownership remains.263 
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With respect to the debate on whether indirect expropriation was contemplated by NIPCA, it 
is critical to highlight the provision of section 25 of the NIPCA which provides as follows:264 
(1)       Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section 
 
(a)       no enterprise shall be nationalized or expropriated by any 
Government of the Federation; and 
 
(b)       no person who owns, whether wholly or in part, the capital of 
any enterprise shall be compelled by law to surrender his 
interest in the capital to any other person. 
 
2)        There shall be no acquisition of an enterprise to which this Act 
applies by the Federal Government, unless the acquisition is in 
the national interest or for a public purpose and under a law 
which makes provision for 
 
(a)       payment of fair and adequate compensation; and 
 
(b)       a right of access to the courts for the determination of the 
investor’s interest or right and the amount of compensation to 
which he is entitled. 
 
(3)       Any compensation payable under this section shall be paid 
without undue delay, and authorisation for its repatriation in 
convertible currency shall where applicable, be issued. 
 
Clearly, the above-quoted expropriation provision of NIPCA omits the phrase ‘actions 
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation’ as well as the word ‘indirect’. It could be 
argued that omission of the word ‘indirect’ and the phrase ‘actions tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation’ from the expropriation provision of NIPCA suggests that 
only direct expropriation is contemplated by NIPCA. This is based on the principle that the 
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.265 This is further bolstered by the 
provision of the NIPCA to the effect that no person shall be compelled by law to surrender 
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his interest in the capital to any person.266 Compelling a person by law to surrender his 
interest in capital to any other person shows direct expropriation. Be that as it may, investors 
often place reliance on the provisions of BITs, rather than domestic statutes when filing 
claims against host nations at arbitral tribunals. The definition of expropriation by arbitral 
tribunals often includes indirect expropriation in view of the fact that many BITs explicitly 
include ‘indirect’ and/or the phrase ‘actions tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation’.267  This, therefore, shows that the decisions of arbitral tribunals may not be 
helpful in interpreting some of the provisions of the NIPCA on expropriation. 
While it may be argued that the words ‘expropriation’ and ‘nationalization’ used in NIPCA 
do not cover indirect expropriation, the argument may have no basis in practice as investors 
often hinge their claims against host states on BITS which explicitly make provision for 
indirect expropriation by making use of the word and/or phrase, ‘indirect’ and ‘measures 
having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation’ respectively. Nevertheless, 
where Nigeria does not have a BIT with an investor’s home country, the NIPCA and/or 
contracts assume significance. It remains unclear whether the NIPCA contemplates both 
direct and indirect expropriation. However, if the direct/indirect expropriation argument were 
to be made, it would appear that legislative reforms on gas flaring reduction will amount to 
neither direct nor indirect expropriation. As will be discussed in the next subsection, 
environmental measures such as gas flaring regulation fall within the scope of regulatory 
measures that do not require the payment of compensation. Scholars such as Subedi have also 
argued that states are allowed under customary international law to take restrictive measures 
with the aim of protecting the environment and such measures could be deemed appropriate 
even if they negatively impact foreign investors.268 Based on the foregoing analysis, this 
thesis contends that the NIPCA will not hinder legislative reforms aimed at gas flaring 
reduction in Nigeria.269 
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3.4.2 Nigeria’s Bilateral Investment Treaties and Expropriation 
BITs are regarded as the foundation of FDI protection under international law and the modern 
legal framework in international investment law is principally molded by the remarkable 
volume of bilateral agreements between states on matters of foreign investment.270 Most BITs 
are formed between developed countries and countries in the global south.271 Salacuse argues 
that these global south countries have been unrelenting in signing more BITs as they believe 
it will trigger economic growth and development.272 
BITs emerged as a major feature in international investment towards the end of the 20th 
century.273 They strive to put in place rules by which the investments made by the nationals 
of two states parties in each other’s state will be protected.274 The purport of BITs is often 
found in the preamble of the instruments. For example, the Canada-Nigeria BIT of 2014 
provides as follows: 
CANADA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (the “Parties”),  
RECOGNIZING that the promotion and the protection of investments of 
investors of one Party in the territory of the other Party will be conducive to 
the stimulation of mutually beneficial business activity, to the development of 
economic cooperation between them and to the promotion of sustainable 
development, and acknowledging the right of each Party to define the 
conditions under which foreign investments are admitted, consistent with this 
Agreement, and investors’ duty to respect and operate within the framework of 
its laws, which must be consistent with this Agreement, HAVE AGREED….. 
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Although treaties are presumably made for the advantage of state parties, in practice, the 
national investors of one party investing in the country of the other party gains from the 
benefits found in the treaty.275 In addition, in theory, a state party itself can file an action 
against the other party under international law for neglecting to uphold the treaty’s 
obligations.276 BITs are based on the view that they encourage investment from investor 
territories to investor-receiving territories.277 The aim of BITs is not only to set out a 
particular standard of protection available to foreign investors but to also make provision for 
international investor-state arbitration as a practical inducement and protection for foreign 
investors.   
Investing in countries in the global south, including Nigeria, is seen as involving some degree 
of unpredictability for the foreign investor in view of the prevailing socio-political and 
economic challenges being faced by such countries.278 While there is no concrete proof to 
support the fact that BITs have enlarged the flow of foreign investment from developed 
countries, they undoubtedly have provided some form of security to foreign investors.279 
They provide guarantee to foreign investors that if anything goes wrong within the host state 
as a result of governmental intervention, they will have an international remedy.280 
Nigeria has signed 30 BITs, out of which 15 are in force.281 Three of the BITs in force have 
been entered into with home states of IOCs. They are the Nigeria – UK BIT, the Netherlands 
– Nigeria BIT and the Italy – Nigeria BIT. Although Nigeria has yet to enter into any BIT 
with the United States, US IOCs operating in Nigeria are protected under the provisions of 
the NIPCA, relevant contracts, and customary international law. The Preamble of the Nigeria 
– UK BIT highlights some of the purposes of the BIT. It states that the Governments of 
Nigeria and the UK, desirous of establishing good conditions for bigger investments by 
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persons and corporations of one country in the territory of the other, acknowledging that the 
promotion and reciprocal safeguard of such investment under international standards will be 
favourable and lead to prosperity of both countries, and acknowledging the right of each 
party to describe the circumstances under which foreign investment can be received, agree to 
the provisions of the BIT. It is apparent that these BITs aim at improving foreign 
participation and making sure investments are protected.282 The benefits of foreign 
investments in countries in the global south like Nigeria could be enjoyed when there is an 
environmentally responsible framework in place.283 
As regards the expropriation provision of Nigeria’s BITs, the Nigeria – UK BIT, Netherlands 
– Nigeria BIT and Italy – Nigeria BIT all have expropriation provisions but do not define 
expropriation.284 For instance the Netherlands-Nigeria BIT provides as follows:285 
Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or 
indirectly, nationals of the other Contracting Party of their investments unless 
the following conditions are complied with:  
(a) the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law;  
(b) the measures are not discriminatory or contrary to any undertaking which 
the Contracting Party which takes such measures may have given;  
(c) the measures are accompanied by provision for the payment of just 
compensation. Such compensation shall represent the genuine value of the 
investments affected, shall include interest at a normal commercial rate until 
the date of payment and shall, in order to be effective for the claimants, be 
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paid and made transferable, without undue delay, to the country designated by 
the claimants concerned and in the currency of the country of which the 
claimants are nationals or in any freely convertible currency accepted by the 
claimants. 
The absence of a definite description of expropriation may unjustifiably allow IOCs to claim 
that the expropriation provision in this BIT covers environmental regulation including gas 
flaring regulation since it has bearing on foreign investments in Nigeria.286 It is apparent from 
the Netherlands-Nigeria BIT that it refers to indirect expropriation. Tribunals have reached 
different conclusions in determining the serious question of whether environmental regulation 
amounts to an indirect expropriation.287 The divergent decisions of tribunals may be 
attributed to the absence of stare decisis in making arbitral awards.288  In view of the fact that 
different tribunals may reach dissimilar conclusions when confronted with the same facts and 
law, it has been difficult to determine the question of whether environmental regulation 
amounts to indirect expropriation.289 
Scholars such as Di Benedetto emphasize the importance of decoupling a proper exercise of 
regulatory powers by the government taken to protect fundamental environmental values 
from the scope of indirect expropriation.290 A number of scholars acknowledge the normative 
autonomy of regulatory measures deriving from regulatory state actions which does not 
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require compensation.291 Indeed, one of the criteria used by arbitral tribunals in 
differentiating between regulatory measures which require no compensation and an action 
tantamount to indirect expropriation is the legitimate expectation test.292 Legitimate 
expectation is not violated if a change in a host state’s action happens within the confines of 
usual modifications customary in the host state and allowed in other states.293 Since gas 
flaring regulation through the AGRA falls within the customary practice of Nigeria, a change 
in gas flaring regulation could fall within the confines of legitimate expectations of the 
investor. Within the context of this thesis, it could be argued that Nigeria may not have to pay 
any compensation to the IOCs operating in the Niger Delta in order to implement its 
legislation on gas flaring. This stems from the fact that gas flaring regulation falls within the 
scope of regulatory measures that do not require payment of any compensation. Basically, 
Nigeria could adopt legislative reforms and such reforms will not amount to indirect 
expropriation.294  
Given that this thesis recognizes that contracts could either impede or enhance legislative 
reforms, the next section discusses environmentally relevant clauses and standards in oil and 
gas contracts in Nigeria. 
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3.5 Recognizing Environmentally Relevant Clauses and Standards in Oil And Gas 
Contracts 
In canvassing the central argument of this thesis which lies in legislative reforms, this thesis 
acknowledges that Nigeria’s contracts with IOCs can either strengthen or undermine gas 
flaring reduction efforts in Nigeria. Gao argues that environmental concerns have not 
“received enough attention” in oil and gas agreements.295 According to Tienhaara, the oil and 
gas industry in developed countries is confronted with stringent environmental standards.296 
However, most of the world’s established crude oil reserves are found in countries in the 
global south such as Nigeria which do not possess advanced regimes for environmental 
protection. 
In the Nigerian oil and gas sector, contracts are the means through which the relationship 
between the government and foreign investors are concretized.297 The contracts in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry often take the form of production sharing contracts, concession 
contracts, joint-venture agreements and risks service contract.298 The most common form of 
oil and gas agreement is the joint-venture agreement.299 The Nigerian government, through 
the NNPC obtains participation interests in IOCs’ oil mining leases through the joint 
venture.300 Apart from reference to domestic law and industry standards, it could be 
necessary for these oil and gas contracts to make reference to applicable international 
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environmental standards and principles.301 For instance, Liberia’s Model Petroleum Sharing 
Contract provides as follows: 302 
The Contractor further undertakes to carry out all petroleum operations in 
accordance with Environmental Protection and Management Laws of Liberia 
and all international environmental practice. 
Although ‘international environmental practice” mentioned in the above Liberia’s Model 
Petroleum Sharing Contract could be interpreted to cover gas flaring reduction, the phrase, 
‘international environmental practice’ seems vague. Be that as it may, in addition to domestic 
law and industry standards, it is important that all oil and gas contracts in Nigeria make 
reference to relevant international environmental standards on GHG emissions that impact 
gas flaring.  
This thesis will proceed to examine some of the environmentally relevant clauses which 
could enhance or impede gas flaring regulation. The clauses which could enhance gas flaring 
regulation in Nigeria include clauses on gas flaring and environmental impact assessment 
clauses. This section also considers whether stabilization clauses would impact the 
practicability of legislative reforms. 
3.5.1 Environmental Impact Assessment Clauses 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a basic requirement in the oil and gas sector, and 
is compulsory for all development projects in the public and private sectors.303 The 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIAA) deals with the concerns of environmental 
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effects with respect to public and private projects in Nigeria.304 The main aim of an EIA is to 
make sure that possible environmental risks are anticipated at the right stage of a project and 
eliminated in advance.305 These risks may include the dangers posed by gas flaring in 
Nigeria. The EIA procedure must suggest mitigation measures in order to reduce the adverse 
effects of the project on the environment and property.306 The nature of EIA clauses differs 
and could range from a short note of the existence of the requirement to a properly outlined 
detail about what the EIA should cover and when it should be put forward.307  Basically, the 
EIA clauses in oil and gas contracts enhance gas flaring reduction efforts and will not likely 
undermine legislative reforms. 
3.5.2 Clauses On Gas Flaring 
Some oil and gas contracts contain explicit provisions on gas flaring. For instance, article 
5(5) of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste’s model Production Sharing Contract 
provides that gas flaring will only be allowed with the consent of the government or in an 
emergency.308 In some cases, such clauses may restrict the government from unreasonably 
withholding or delaying consent.309 Some oil and gas contracts may sometimes make 
permissive provisions on gas flaring. In buttressing this point, Tienhaara cites article 15(3) of 
Bangladesh 2008 Model Production Sharing Contract and contends that even though this 
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clause gives preference to gas utilization, it appears to be tolerant of gas flaring.310 This thesis 
contends that if clauses on gas flaring are included in oil and gas contracts in Nigeria, they 
could support existing laws in curtailing the incidence of gas flaring. Such clauses will not 
likely undermine legislative reforms aimed at reducing gas flaring. 
3.5.3 Stabilization Clauses 
In ascertaining the practicability of legislative reforms, this thesis considers inter alia 
whether stabilization clauses in oil and gas contracts would impact legislative reforms. 
Stabilization clauses do not assume a specific form and can take the form of a freezing 
stabilization clause, economic equilibrium clause or hybrid clause. While freezing 
stabilization clauses seek to  ‘freeze’ the legal framework applicable to the investment at the 
time the contract is formed,311 the nature of stabilization clauses has developed in recent 
years, resulting in kinds of stabilization clauses that seek to ensure economic equilibrium 
between parties.312 Unlike the freezing stabilization clause, the economic equilibrium clause 
does not restrict modification to the legal framework governing a project.313 Instead, it 
contemplates that where such modifications happen, the contracting parties shall be restored 
to the position they were before the modifications.314 For example, the West African Gas 
Pipeline Agreement stipulates that the contracting parties shall make sure a solution is 
negotiated which restores the West African Gas Pipeline Company and/or its shareholders to 
the same or an economically corresponding position it was or they were before a modification 
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to the legislative framework governing the project was made.315  The hybrid clause maintains 
the features of a freezing and economic equilibrium clause.316 The hybrid clause seeks to 
freeze the legal framework governing a project while also making provision for the 
restoration of economic equilibrium or payment of compensation where a modification to the 
legal framework negatively impacts the fiscal interest of a company.317 Basically, 
stabilization clauses may be firmly restricted to cover only some issues although the parties 
may clearly include or exclude issues such as environmental protection.318  
Since the primary consideration of IOCs is the stability of the agreements entered with host 
states, stabilization clauses are often included in agreements between IOCs and host states in 
order to safeguard the interest of the oil companies.319 Stabilization clauses such as the 
economic equilibrium and the hybrid stabilization clauses could be considered as part of the 
mechanisms for protecting foreign investors from political hazards while ensuring that the 
host state maintains its legislative responsibilities including legislative reforms. Several 
countries in the global south including Nigeria now provide legal backing for stabilization 
clauses by including stabilization requirements in some statutory enactments.320 One of such 
legislation in Nigeria is the law establishing the Liquefied Natural Gas Project (LNG 
Project).321 The stabilization clause prevents the Nigeria LNG Limited from being subject to 
new legislation or policies that are not applicable to companies incorporated in Nigeria or to 
shareholders in companies incorporated in Nigeria.322 Stabilization requirements such as this 
will not likely impact gas flaring regulation as Nigeria’s gas flaring regulations do apply to 
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both IOCs and companies incorporated in Nigeria. The legislative reforms envisaged in this 
thesis encompass both local and foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria.  
Be that as it may, the validity of ‘freezing’ stabilization clauses in Nigeria has been 
challenged. Under the Nigerian constitution, the National Assembly has power to enact laws 
concerning any matter falling within the purview of the areas itemized in both the exclusive 
legislative list and the concurrent legislative list.323 Oshionebo argues that a contractual or 
statutory stabilization clause is invalid and unconstitutional if it seeks to restrict the capacity 
of the National Assembly to enact laws that modify the legal framework governing a 
project.324 He further contends that while freezing stabilization clauses seek to restrict host 
states from making modifications to the legal framework governing a project, they cannot, in 
law, restrict host states from modifying their legal framework.325 
In the same vein, arbitral tribunals have held that despite a stabilization clause, host states 
could modify the legal framework recognized in oil and gas contracts where the modification 
is required in the public interest. Particularly, in BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic,326 the arbitral tribunal recognized that even though 
the stabilization clause restricted the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic’s freedom to 
unilaterally modify the terms of the agreement, Libya could modify such terms in the public 
interest.327 Oshionebo argues that the finding of the tribunal finds support in the premise that 
legislation created by the host state maintains its validity even if the legislation contravenes 
the stabilization requirements stated in previous contracts entered into by the State.328 Infact, 
a stabilization clause is invalid if it constrains the host state for a very long period”.329 
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Going forward, stabilization clauses can be formulated in a manner that excludes areas such 
as environmental protection including gas flaring regulation from their application. In 
buttressing this point, Tienhaara cites a Kazakhstan agreement which provides for a caveat to 
its stabilization clause as follows:330 
provided, however, that no amendment to this Agreement shall be required 
hereunder as the result of (i) changes to Laws concerning health, safety or 
environmental protection that cause such Laws to be consistent with 
international standards for health, safety or environmental legislation and are 
applied on a non-discriminatory basis.  
Nigeria can take a cue from the above-cited provision of the Kazakhstan agreement in 
excluding gas flaring regulation from the application of stabilization clauses. With respect to 
existing stabilization clauses, this thesis relies on the analysis of their validity under Nigerian 
law, as well as the decision of the arbitral tribunal in BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic331 and posits that under Nigerian and international 
laws, existing stabilization clauses will not restrict legislative reforms aimed at gas flaring 
reduction in Nigeria. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In investigating the practicability of legislative reforms, this chapter has analyzed the 
regulatory framework for international investment law in Nigeria and argued that gas flaring 
regulation may not be restricted by Nigeria’s investment laws, BITs and contracts. As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, the continuous flaring of gas in Nigeria has given rise to 
environmental, health and social challenges. This can be attributed to the inadequacies of the 
current gas flaring reduction law. Clearly, the incidence of gas flaring in Nigeria 
demonstrates that legislative reform is an important measure that must be undertaken by the 
Nigerian government. This chapter has explored the question of whether legislative reform 
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would be considered expropriation of an IOC’s investment. Basically, the chapter contends 
that legislative reforms that aim at gas flaring reduction would not amount to expropriation of 
an IOC’s investment. The chapter also showed that under Nigerian and international laws, 
existing stabilization clauses will not restrict legislative reforms aimed at gas flaring 
reduction in Nigeria. 
Some IOCs are already participating in gas flaring reduction efforts by supporting the World 
Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction Initiative and developing parameters aimed at avoiding 
routine flaring of gas.332 While gas flaring reduction requires several approaches as noted in 
chapter one, legislative reform is a necessary component to that reduction. The next chapter 
analyzes legislative reform and the components of such reform. 
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CHAPTER 4: INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 
INTO DOMESTIC LAWS AND ENACTING NEW GAS FLARING LEGISLATION 
4.1 Introduction  
Central to this thesis is the argument that the challenges posed by GHG emissions from gas 
flaring in Nigeria can be addressed through legislative reforms. However, as indicated in the 
introductory chapter, this thesis does not anticipate solving the problem of gas flaring in 
Nigeria through legislative reforms in isolation. Legislative reform is a step that must be 
undertaken by the Nigerian government as the current legislation governing gas flaring is 
inadequate, ineffective, and unconstitutional. This chapter analyzes the formulation of 
effective legislation in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector well as the domestication of international 
environmental standards on GHG emissions to which Nigeria is a party as components of the 
legislative reform envisaged in this thesis. 
This chapter argues that the incidence of GHG emissions from gas flaring in Nigeria could 
possibly be effectively addressed if international treaties on GHG emissions to which Nigeria 
is a party are incorporated into domestic laws. In addition to the domestication of 
international environmental standards, the chapter presents some of the insights proposed by 
Institutionalist Legislative Theory and Methodology (ILTAM) as a possible guide for 
designing the legislative reforms. 
Apart from this introduction, two substantive sections comprise this chapter. Section one 
undertakes a critical analysis of international environmental standards on GHG emissions. 
This analysis demonstrates the capacity of the Nigerian government to domesticate these 
GHG emissions standards. The second section explores the importance of domesticating the 
international environmental standards discussed in section one. The section also proposes the 
enactment of new legislation that addresses the inadequacies of the AGRA. Essentially, the 
chapter focuses on the public participation of people affected by gas flaring which may be 
fostered through ILTAM’s interest in transparency, clear problem identification and public 
participation in the enactment and monitoring of legislation. The chapter ends on a positive 
note, presenting issues requiring further research, and positing that part of the solution to 
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reducing GHG emissions from gas flaring in Nigeria lies in enacting new legislation as well 
as domesticating international environmental standards on GHG emissions. 
 
4.2 Analysis of International Environmental Standards and Principles on Gas Flaring 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, gas flaring comes with negative environmental, health, 
social and climatic implications. The consensus within the literature suggests that gas flaring 
contributes substantially to climate change through the emissions of GHGs,333 and this has 
severe consequences for Nigeria and the rest of the world. Particularly, gas flaring in Nigeria 
has contributed more emissions of GHG than all other sources in sub-Saharan Africa put 
together.334 
Climate change has been termed the most serious hazard that threatens the earth’s 
biodiversity, natural resources, agriculture, water availability etc.335 It is among the most 
serious challenges of our generation and contributes substantial stress to society and the 
environment.336 Climate change can be attributed to human use of fossil fuels, which emit 
carbon dioxide and other GHGs into the atmosphere.337 This carbon dioxide and GHGs 
capture heat within the atmosphere, which affects the climate by way of rising sea levels, 
harsh weather conditions, and famines. According to the UN Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), climate change is real and humans are the major cause through the 
emission of GHGs.338 Without doubt, GHGs are vital to human life as they prevent some of 
the sun’s heat from making the earth unlivable. However, industrial activities such as gas 
flaring have increased the quantity of GHGs in the atmosphere. Over the past few years, the 
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earth’s average temperature has increased by 3 degrees centigrade.339 Climate change has 
seriously impacted countries of the global south and this is demonstrated by the frequent and 
exacerbated floods and storms caused by rising sea levels and warming of ocean 
temperatures. Despite the challenges posed by climate change, countries in the global south, 
including Nigeria, seem to be interested in the constant flow of foreign revenue into their 
territories without taking into account the climatic implications of foreign investment. In the 
same vein, climate change skeptics have often posited that recent variations in climate 
ascribed to human and corporations’ activities could be described as part of the normal 
changes in earth’s climate and temperature, and that it is impracticable to establish a nexus 
between climate change and any climate conditions.340 However, several years of data 
analysis lend credence to the reality of this challenge as well as the human factor associated 
with it. A synthesis report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reveals 
that human impact on climate change is visible and contemporary anthropogenic release of 
GHGs is the largest in history.341 Gas flaring is one of such human components linked to the 
recent variations in the earth’s climate. 
The recognition and entrenchment of environmental principles such as sustainable 
development will bolster gas flaring reduction efforts in Nigeria. A report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, “Our Common Goal”, described sustainable 
development as a change process in which resource exploitation, the alignment of investment, 
the adaptation of technological development and institutional change are all in consonance 
and promote present and future likelihood to address human needs and objectives.342 
Verschuuren conceives of the notion of sustainable development as an “ideal”, rather than a 
principle.343 According to Verschuuren, the ideal of sustainable development as articulated in 
numerous instruments does not stipulate fundamental rules without which it is impracticable 
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to have an ordered society, but sustainable development is an inexact, indefinite and 
undefined, general notion of the perfection that states ought to target.344 This thesis argues 
that regardless of the distinction between an ‘ideal’ and ‘principle’ regarding the 
conceptualization of sustainable development, there is no doubt that sustainable development 
challenges faced by Nigeria includes pollution caused by gas flaring. Just as the preambles of 
Nigeria’s BITs are beginning to make reference to sustainable development, the restructured 
and domesticated legislation proposed in this thesis should also take cognizance of 
sustainable development. The integration of sustainable development into legislation entails 
the need to ensure that economic and social interests, where they are represented, do not 
ignore environmental considerations.345 It also requires that when environmental protection 
measures aimed at gas flaring reduction are carried out, the economic or social effects of such 
measures need to be taken into consideration.346 
There is presently no treaty particularly devoted to putting an end to gas flaring. In view of 
this, this section will analyze international environmental standards on GHG emissions such 
as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),347 the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC (Kyoto Protocol) 348 and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change 
(Paris Agreement).349 These conventions are aimed at reducing GHG emissions, and in the 
absence of a specific international convention on gas flaring, the provisions of these 
conventions implicate GHG emissions from gas flaring. 
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4.2.1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
The UNFCCC is the foremost and most significant watershed in the multidimensional effort 
to tackle climate change.350 The UNFCCC is one of the three conventions adopted at the Rio 
Earth Summit in 1992,351 and its ultimate goal is to stabilize GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a degree that will inhibit dangerous human interference with the climate 
system.352 The Convention requires that such degree should be attained within a time-frame 
necessary to permit ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to make sure that food 
production is not endangered, and to foster sustainable economic development.353 The 
Convention came into force on March 21, 1994, and presently, 197 countries have ratified 
it.354 In furtherance of article 22 of the Convention, the UNFCCC is subject to ratification, 
adoption, or approval by countries and regional economic integration associations.355 It 
allows countries and regional economic integration associations that have not signed the 
Convention to agree to it at any time.356 
Farber and Peeters write that the UNFCCC sets out numerous operating principles that offer 
conceptual anchorage for the climate regime.357 One of such principles is the equity and 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.358 Farber and Peeters 
assert that the Convention is the foremost international environmental standard to express the 
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principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
in a workable provision.359 The principle developed from the understanding of the “common 
heritage of mankind” and is a demonstration of universal principles of equity in international 
law.360 It acknowledges historical disparities in the contributions of developed and global 
south countries to global environmental challenges, as well as disparities in their respective 
economic and technical abilities to address these challenges.361 In line with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities, as well as social and economic 
circumstances, parties to the Convention recognize that the universal nature of climate 
change demands the broadest practicable cooperation by all countries.362 This principle has 
worked as a guiding principle as well as a basis for arguments in the UN climate negotiations. 
For instance, while global south countries like Nigeria have argued on the basis of this 
principle for developed countries’ leadership and differential treatment for global south 
countries, developed countries contend that the principle must be understood as a dynamic 
notion  that changes concurrently with changing economic and other circumstances.363  
Also, in reflecting the principle, the Convention splits countries into “Annex I” and “non-
Annex I” countries, with the former representing developed countries and the latter 
representing global south countries.364 The Convention stipulates greater mitigation roles for 
Annex I countries compared to the non-Annex I countries.365 Nigeria is not included in the 
Annex I countries, and this suggests lesser mitigation responsibilities for Nigeria. Despite the 
incessant gas flaring in Nigeria, one cannot compare the levels of GHGs emitted from all 
sources in industrialized countries to GHG emissions from Nigeria.  However, there is no 
basis for allowing countries such as Nigeria to enjoy lesser commitments under the 
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Convention in view of the level of GHG emitted from gas flaring in Nigeria. Conversely, 
assuming the Convention created binding obligations on Nigeria, it will only be enforceable 
after it has been domestically incorporated into a law.366 
Furthermore, the UNFCCC acknowledges that the absence of complete scientific certainty on 
issues of climate change ought not to serve as a justification for delaying action.367 
Specifically, the Convention provides in article 3(3) as follows:368 
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking 
into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be 
cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. 
Article 3(3) is drafted in a manner that its language is unassertive and weak. Farber and 
Peeters argue that article 3(3) refers to “precautionary measures”, and neither defines 
precaution as a “principle” nor an “approach”. They contend that while an “approach” is 
rather unclear from a legal perspective, a “principle” presupposes legal effects.369 This thesis 
agrees with the writers and argues that the drafters of article 3(3) preferred the phrase 
“precautionary measures” to “principle” which presupposes a non-obligatory plan or course 
of action. Relatedly, article 3(3) also depicts a right to take preventive measures, and not an 
obligation to take action.370 Also, the provision of article 3(3) is permissive in nature in view 
of the fact that it provides that parties “should” take precautionary measures, rather than 
“shall” which is much more prescriptive and forceful. As a result, the permissive provision of 
article 3(3) makes it easier for Nigeria to avoid taking actions aimed at mitigating GHG 
emissions from gas flaring. Nigeria became a signatory to the UNFCCC on June 13, 1992, 
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and ratified same on August 29, 1994,371 but did not domesticate the UNFCCC which was 
eventually operationalized by the Kyoto Protocol. 
4.2.2 Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted on December 11, 1997, and entered into force on February 
16, 2005 as a result of the intricate ratification process.372 At the moment, there are 192 
parties to the Protocol.373 The Kyoto Protocol operationalizes the UNFCCC and commits 
industrialized countries to stabilize GHG emissions based on the principles of the 
Convention, and in line with agreed individual targets.374 The UNFCCC itself merely induces 
countries to do so. The Protocol bolsters the commitments of the UNFCCC, particularly 
article 4(2) (a) and (b) by presenting a firm agenda for the reduction of GHG emissions to be 
accomplished within 2008-2012.375 
In line with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the Kyoto Protocol 
also imposed legally binding mitigation commitments only on Annex I countries, and made 
no provisions for binding commitments for the global south countries.376 In this respect, 
Bothe writes that the exclusion of non-Annex I countries creates a “firewall” between 
developed countries and global south countries, which was vital in the United States’ refusal 
to ratify the Protocol, and has occasioned massive tensions over the years.377 According to 
Richardson, the disparity between developed and global south countries fails to take into 
account substantial socio-economic and environmental disparities amongst global south 
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countries.378 This is in view of the fact that some of these non-Annex I countries such as 
China and India are gradually evolving as the largest emitters of GHG.379 The preceding 
chapters, for instance, have also shown that Nigeria is one of the largest gas flaring countries 
in the world.  
Annex I countries are required to adopt national policies and take corresponding measures to 
reduce their emissions.380 The Protocol also presented Annex I countries with flexible 
mechanisms381 namely, International Emission Trading, Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), and Joint Implementation. These three market-based mechanisms presuppose that the 
market is the institution most capable of allocating resources cost-effectively, and in 
connection with environmental policy.382 Driesen has critiqued the strong emphasis of the 
Protocol on cost-effectiveness through the market-based mechanisms, and asserts that this has 
led to a huge effort to develop them, perhaps shifting attention from the primary aim of the 
protocol.383 The goal of the Protocol was to reduce industrialized countries’ collective 
emissions of GHG by 5.2% compared to the year 1990.384 In making particular reference to 
Nigeria, Agbonifo has argued that the market-based mechanism, particularly the CDM, 
would have created enormous prospects for the reduction of gas flaring which the current gas 
flaring law has failed to address.385 Nevertheless, Nigeria has been unable to attract a 
substantial part of the global CDM project386 partly in view of the fact that the Kyoto 
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Protocol and its mechanisms were not incorporated into domestic laws in Nigeria.387 
Although Nigeria acceded to the Protocol on December 10, 2004,388 it did not domesticate the 
Protocol in line with the provisions of the Constitution.389 This further reinforces the need for 
the domestication of international environmental standards on GHG emissions to which 
Nigeria is a party. 
The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted on December 8, 2012.390 The 
amendment created new commitments for Annex I parties to the Protocol who accepted to 
undertake commitments to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18 percent beneath 1990 levels 
in a second commitment period beginning from January 1, 2013 and ending on December 31, 
2020.391 Presently, the Doha Amendment is not in force in view of the fact that only 112 
parties have deposited their instrument of acceptance as against 144 parties required by 
law.392 However, under decision 1/CMP.8,393 state parties may temporarily apply the 
amendment pending its entry into force in line with the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, and 
state parties who wish to do so must provide notification of any such provisional application 
to the depository.394 Also, parties that do not intend to apply the amendment as required 
under decision 1/CMP.8 will enforce their commitments and other obligations in respect of 
the second commitment period in a way “consistent with their national legislation or 
domestic processes” as of January 1, 2013 until the entry into force of the amendment.395 
Nigeria is one of the state parties to the Protocol that are yet to sign or accept the Doha 
Amendment.396 It is also doubtful whether Nigeria has deposited any notification of 
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provisional application of the Amendment. It suffices to say that Nigeria has not 
demonstrated any intention to apply the Amendment. Since state parties who do not intend to 
apply the Amendment are required to implement their commitments in a manner consistent 
with their national legislation or domestic processes, it remains to be seen how Nigeria will 
enforce its own commitments.  
The Doha Amendment, which Nigeria is yet to ratify only covers the period before 2020, 
which is essential in the general GHG reduction efforts aimed at keeping the rise in global 
average temperature beneath 2 degrees Centigrade above pre-industrial levels.397 The new 
2015 Paris Agreement will replace the Doha Amendment from 2020.398 
4.2.3 Paris Agreement 
At the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, Paris, also known as COP 21, 
parties to the UNFCCC reached a landmark agreement to eliminate climate change and 
intensify the actions needed for a sustainable low carbon future by signing a legally binding 
agreement on the climate.399 The Agreement rests on the UNFCCC, and for the first time, 
carries all countries into a universal cause to pursue determined efforts to address climate 
change and adapt to its impacts, with heightened support to aid global south countries to do 
so.400 The key objective of the Agreement is to bolster the global reaction to the danger posed 
by climate change by maintaining a “global temperature increase this century far beneath 2 
degrees Centigrade beyond pre-industrial levels and to push towards efforts to restrict the 
temperature rise even further to 1.5 degrees Centigrade”.401 The Paris Agreement is focused 
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on bolstering the capacity of countries to address the effects of climate change.402 The 
Agreement was opened for signature on April 22, 2015 and as at September 2018, 180 parties 
have ratified it.403 It entered into force on November 4, 2016, and charts a new course in the 
global climate effort.404 Although Nigeria has signed and ratified the Paris Agreement,405 the 
Agreement is yet to be domestically incorporated into a law as required by the Nigerian 
Constitution. 
As with the preceding instruments, the Paris Agreement also recognizes the principle of 
equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.406 For this 
reason, scholars such as Pardy state that the Agreement and its preceding Convention are all 
about “wealth distribution, social justice and development”.407 He writes that rather than 
requiring mitigation of GHG emissions and energy use, the Agreement envisions the transfer 
of resources from developed countries to global south countries as well as a rise in energy 
consumption in the global south.408 In the same vein, the United States Government also 
claims that the Agreement imposes largely discriminatory environmental standards on US 
corporations and workers.409 Consequently, the US has given notice of its intention to the 
United Nations to leave the Agreement by 2020, in line with article 28 of the Agreement 
which allows state parties to withdraw from the Agreement at any time after three years from 
the date on which the Agreement comes into force.410 
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In the build-up to the Paris Conference, parties were required to submit Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs) which showed each country’s agenda for tackling climate 
change, mitigating GHG emissions, and how the countries intend to meet those objectives.411 
The Paris Agreement now recognizes these INDCs as Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDC) and mandates parties to carry on and communicate determined efforts through their 
NDCs to respond to the challenges posed by climate change.412 Parties are also mandated to 
report on a frequent basis on emissions and progress towards their NDCs under a 
transparency framework created in article 13 of the Agreement. In line with the requirement 
of the Agreement, Nigeria has submitted its NDC which reports that emissions in Nigeria are 
anticipated to rise to around 900 million tonnes per year by 2030, which means about 3.4 
tonnes per individual.413 A critical look at Nigeria’s NDC reveals that it acknowledges the 
impact of GHG emissions from gas flaring on climate change.414 It provides that one of its 
key aspects is to work towards ending gas flaring by 2030.415 In order to achieve this, the 
NDC proposes several mitigation measures which include reducing the potential GHG 
emissions from gas flaring by 64 million tonnes per year, from 2030.416 A practical means of 
achieving Nigeria’s gas flaring reduction target under its NDC, is to enact comprehensive 
legislation in this regard. 
A synthesis report released by the UNFCCC on the cumulative impact of the NDCs 
submitted by state parties reveals that NDCs are anticipated to bring about substantial 
emissions reductions and reduce GHG emissions progression in the coming years, but would 
be insufficient to counter the rising trend of global GHG emissions by 2025 and 2030.417 A 
more recent synthesis report of the UNFCCC has now concluded that greater GHG emissions 
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mitigation efforts than those related to the NDCs will be needed in the period after 2025 and 
2030 in order to maintain the temperature increase below 2 degrees Centigrade beyond pre-
industrial levels.418 Considering the amount of GHGs emitted by gas flaring, this calls for a 
lasting legal solution to the intractable problem of gas flaring in Nigeria.  
The commitments under the Paris Agreement require governments to be more prescriptive 
about mitigating GHG emissions from gas flaring.419 The Paris Agreement makes some 
binding provisions on Nigeria, but in the absence of domestication, these provisions will not 
be enforceable in Nigeria. Some of these provisions include the obligation to undertake 
domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving its NDCs,420 preparation and 
communication of strategies for low GHG emissions development reflecting its peculiar 
circumstance,421 communication of its NDCs every five years,422 formulation and 
communication of long term low GHG emissions development plans,423 and provision of 
national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions as well as information required in 
assessing progress made in enforcing and achieving its NDC.424  
Given that gas flaring reduction is an important aspect of Nigeria’s NDC, it will be 
imperative for Nigeria to show that it is carrying out domestic mitigation measures aimed at 
reducing gas flaring. It is also mandatory for Nigeria to prepare and communicate its 
strategies such as legislative reforms aimed at achieving low GHG emissions including 
emissions from gas flaring as required under the Paris Agreement. Also, the national 
inventory report of anthropogenic emissions required to be submitted could assist in 
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monitoring progress made towards implementing and achieving Nigeria’s NDC as it relates 
to gas flaring reduction.  
In order for these provisions to be enforceable in Nigeria, they must be incorporated into 
domestic laws. Accordingly, this thesis contends that one of the solutions to the gas flaring 
challenge lies in enacting new legislation and domesticating the provisions of international 
environmental standards on GHG emissions such as the Paris Agreement. 
4.3 Restructuring the Legal and Regulatory Framework for Gas Flaring Reduction in 
Nigeria 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have identified several factors including the 
ineffectiveness of the legal framework for gas flaring as factors militating against gas flaring 
reduction in Nigeria. The legislative reform envisaged in this thesis involves enacting new 
evidence-based legislation in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector and domesticating international 
environmental standards on GHG emissions to which Nigeria is a party. In order to situate the 
proposed reform, it is imperative to first demonstrate the importance of domesticating 
international environmental standards on GHG emissions to which Nigeria is a party.  
4.3.1 Domesticating International Environmental Standards   
As a means of solving the gas flaring problem in Nigeria, this thesis, in part, proposes the 
domestication of the relevant international environmental standards on GHG emissions to 
which Nigeria is a party. As discussed in the preceding sections, Nigeria signed and ratified 
the Paris Agreement but has failed to incorporate the Agreement into domestic laws as 
required by the Constitution. The non-domestication of international environmental standards 
on GHG emissions presents serious implications for their enforceability in Nigeria. 
One of the methods of acquiring obligations at international law is by accepting the text of 
the treaty creating such obligations, and an intention to be so bound by the text is usually 
demonstrated by becoming a signatory to the Agreement.425 According to Onomrerhinor, 
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apart from being a signatory to a treaty, such a treaty may also have to be domesticated by a 
state party to enable the citizens of a state party fully benefit from its provisions.426 In 
Nigeria, the requirement for domestication of treaties is contained in section 12 of the 
Constitution as follows:427 
(1) No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of 
law to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the 
National Assembly. 
(2)  The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part thereof 
with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive Legislative List for the 
purpose of implementing a treaty. 
(3) A bill for an Act of the National Assembly passed pursuant to the provisions 
of subsection (2) of this section shall not be presented to the President for 
assent, and shall not be enacted unless it is ratified by a majority of all the 
House of Assembly in the Federation. 
This provision shows that beyond the ratification of a treaty, it is imperative for Nigeria to 
adopt such treaty into its domestic laws.428 It also shows that Nigerian courts lack the power 
to apply the provision of a treaty without the prior approval of the National Assembly. Over 
the years, Nigeria has ratified numerous treaties including the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris 
Agreement, but in view of the fact that these agreements were not domesticated, they have no 
legal force in Nigeria, and are mere documents in Nigeria’s legal framework. In Nigeria, a 
treaty can be transformed into domestic law by re-enactment or reference.429 While re-
enactment involves recreating specific provisions or the whole the treaty, a treaty can also be 
                                                          
426 Ibid. 
427 Nigerian Constitution 1999, supra note 111. 
428 It is important to note that section 254 ( c) (2) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) appears to have 
excluded the application of section 12(1) of the constitution to treaties relating to labour, employment, 
workplace and industrial relations. International environmental law treaties are still within the purview of 
section 12(1) of the constitution. 
429 Oyebode, supra note 112. 
83 
 
domesticated by making reference to the treaty generally in the title (long or short), preamble 
or schedule of the domestic law.430 
Egede has critiqued the notion of domestication and argued that it is a “colonial relic” borne 
out of the several years of colonial domination under the British.431 In canvassing his 
argument that Nigeria embraced the British standard requiring a treaty to be domesticated 
into law in order to apply locally, Egede refers to the decision of the Nigerian Supreme Court 
in Ibidapo v Lufthansa Airlines where the court remarked that “Nigeria, like any other 
Commonwealth country, inherited the English common law rules governing the municipal 
application of international law”.432 Nonetheless, the Nigerian courts have also reiterated the 
relevance of domestication as provided under the Constitution. In Abacha v Fawehinmi,433 
the Supreme Court posited that an international treaty entered into by Nigeria only becomes 
binding upon its enactment into law by the National Assembly. In other words, until such a 
treaty is incorporated into domestic law, it will remain non-justiciable before the Nigerian 
courts. In Abacha v Fawehinmi, the court further remarked emphatically that “no matter how 
beneficial to the country or the citizenry an international treaty to which Nigeria has become 
a signatory may be it remains unenforceable, if it is not enacted into law of the country by the 
National Assembly”.434 Similarly, in Mhwun v Minister of Health & Productivity & Ors,435 
the court re-emphasized the importance of domestication and held as follows: 
In so far as the ILO convention has not been enacted into law by the National 
Assembly, it has no force of law in Nigeria and it cannot possibly 
apply....Where, however, the treaty is enacted into law by the National 
Assembly as was the case with the African Charter which is incorporated into 
our municipal (i.e domestic) law by the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. 10, Laws of the 
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Federation of Nigeria 1990, it becomes binding and our courts must give effect 
to it like all other laws falling within the judicial powers of the Courts 
Although the above dictum relates to the provisions of the International Labour Organization 
Convention, it is nonetheless a treaty within the contemplation of section 12 of the 
Constitution. In critiquing the notion of domestication, Egede further writes that the 
government may ratify treaties to the advantage of its citizens, enact them as law and proceed 
to modify or amend the laws in order to rob its citizens of the benefits of the treaties.436  
On a related note, when states meet to discuss and agree to the text of a treaty, it presupposes 
that the states parties agree to the obligation and responsibility arising from the treaty. 
Onomrerhinor argues that it is a demonstration of bad faith for state parties to assert inability 
to accept the responsibilities arising from a treaty on grounds of non-domestication.437 It is 
also argued that the lack of domestication of treaties is often a tactic to avoid obligations 
arising from the treaty.438 If this argument is applied to the non-domestication of the Paris 
Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol, one may assert that non-domestication is a tactic adopted 
by Nigeria to avoid domestic obligations that could arise from the domestication of the 
Agreements.439 This is worrisome considering the importance of the agreements and their 
potential impact in mitigating GHG emissions from gas flaring. However, as earlier indicated 
in the preceding chapters, it is gratifying that the Nigerian government is beginning to 
demonstrate willingness to mitigate GHG emissions from gas flaring. 
Nevertheless, the provisions of non-domesticated agreements could be applied indirectly. For 
instance, the courts can rely on them as aids in interpreting similar provisions in the 
constitution or other local laws.440 Similarly, a treaty which has not been incorporated into a 
domestic law may apply in Nigeria if its underlying principles have evolved into rules of 
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customary international law. The courts have consistently noted that in Nigeria, as in other 
common law countries, treaties could be applied as customary international law.441 The 
premise for this assertion lies in the fact that a conventional rule can be regarded to have 
evolved into customary international law if it is a rationally expedient and a self-evident 
result of essential international law principles or if it forms opinio juris.442 In order to be 
considered an opinio juris, there must be an established and undeniable practice of states to 
act in conformity to the rule, and states must obey the rule because they regard themselves 
legally bound by the rule.443 A conventional rule must also meet the requirement of 
widespread participation in it, to be considered customary international law.444 A critical look 
at the various international environmental standards on GHG emissions including the Paris 
Agreement to which Nigeria is a party reveals that they are informed by international 
environmental principles such as sustainable development and have been adopted widely by 
most countries. It could be argued that their provisions are gradually evolving as customary 
international law. However, it is doubtful whether this has obviated the need for the 
domestication of the Agreement under section 12 of the constitution in view of the supremacy 
of the Nigerian Constitution.445 
Nonetheless, this thesis maintains that undomesticated treaties continue to present critical 
challenges in terms of their enforcement in Nigeria. In buttressing this point, Okeke and 
Anushiem express the view that the lack of domestication of treaties comes with serious 
consequences.446 It prevents citizens who already lack jurisdiction to enforce their rights 
under the treaties in international courts, from approaching domestic courts to do so.447 For 
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instance, if the Paris Agreement is not domesticated, Nigerians may be unable to approach 
domestic courts to ensure Nigeria’s commitments under its NDCs are met. Also, some of 
Nigeria’s binding commitments under the Paris Agreement will be enforceable in Nigeria if 
the Agreement is domesticated. As earlier indicated, some of these commitments include 
carrying out domestic mitigation measures aimed at reducing gas flaring, preparing and 
communicating strategies aimed at achieving low GHG emissions from gas flaring and 
maintaining a national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions. Basically, the non-
domestication of treaties does not only encourage state parties including Nigeria to avoid 
their treaty obligations, but also encourages such state parties to breach critical environmental 
commitments with serious impacts on the well-being of citizens.  
It bears repeating that the Nigerian Government cannot be held liable by impacted 
communities and Nigerians as a whole for failing to comply with agreements such as the 
Paris Agreement, which are yet to be domesticated. This further reinforces the need for the 
domestication of international environmental standards on GHG emissions to which Nigeria 
is a party. While this thesis acknowledges that effective legislative reform entails the 
domestication of international environmental standards, it also emphasizes the need for the 
enactment of a new gas flaring legislation.  
4.3.2 Towards a New Gas Flaring Legislation 
In achieving the reforms advocated in this thesis, this section discusses some of the insights 
presented by the concept of evidence-based legislation. This discussion is only an 
introduction to what the process of enacting and implementing the new legislation proposed 
in this thesis could look like. 
The concept of evidence-based legislation is fairly novel but stems from a wide-ranging body 
of disciplines including evidence-based medicine and evidence-based policy.448 It demands 
the use of the best accessible empirical evidence and methodically obtained data, when 
accessible, by lawmakers as a basis for the writing and enactment of laws.449 In describing 
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the move towards evidence-based legislation, one scholar writes that “the legislator in his 
choices for legislative interventions takes a rational and focused approach and does not let 
himself be guided by just political and ideological reasoning, but also by relevant results of 
scientific inquiry assessing the (expected) effectiveness of those interventions”.450 Another 
scholar posits that “laws and policy initiatives are to be supported by research evidence, and 
policies are preferably introduced on a trial and error basis”.451 He further asserts that 
enforcement should only be contemplated on a wider scale after an assessment of 
experiments has been done.452 However, critics assert that the benefits of an evidence-based 
approach should not be overemphasized in view of the fact that politicians and lawmakers are 
not often willing to put scientific insights into consideration in lawmaking.453 Critics also 
contend that placing so much reliance on the need to support legislative drafts with scientific 
data and evidence could yield counter-productive results, and “turn evidence based policy-
making into policy-based evidence-making”.454 Nonetheless, scholars such as Rachinski 
express the view that as lawmakers are becoming exposed to scientific ways of thinking 
about legal issues, evidence-based legislation is gradually emerging as a genuine lawmaking 
phenomenon.455 Similarly, other scholars have continued to advocate for law and policy 
makers to base their decisions on the findings of research driven by facts.456  The evidence-
based guide considered in this thesis is the ILTAM. 
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4.3.2.1 Enacting New Gas Flaring Reduction Law that Encourages Public 
Participation of Local Communities 
In order to achieve the substantial reforms proposed in this thesis, this thesis presents some of 
the insights proposed by ILTAM as a possible tool for designing the legislative reforms. This 
thesis considers the ILTAM model in enunciating a problem-solving approach encompassing 
four decision-making steps which a drafter needs to follow when creating and implementing 
new legislation or regulation. These steps include ascertaining the social problem at issue,457 
identifying the reasons for the problematic behaviours,458 drafting the legislation,459 as well as 
monitoring and enforcing the new law, assessing it and providing details as regards its 
enforcement and social effects.460 The monitoring and assessment component of the ILTAM 
requires the lawmaker to include provisions on monitoring and implementation in the draft 
bill. In view of the fact that gas flaring persists in Nigeria, partly because of the 
ineffectiveness of Nigeria’s gas flaring law, the ILTAM could serve as a possible tool for 
achieving the legislative reforms proposed in this thesis. The ILTAM could possibly help in 
the enactment of laws that have good chances of working. A law works if it induces its 
specified behaviour and helps to resolve the targeted social problem.461 In drafting the new 
bill, this thesis posits that the bill should take cognizance of GHG emissions reduction 
standards as well as international environmental principles such as sustainable development 
and polluter pays principle, and make clear provisions regarding its implementation. The 
deficiencies of the AGRA discussed in chapter two should also be taken into account in 
drafting the bill. 
In addressing a social problem, the ILTAM proposes that a law must put into consideration 
the problematic conducts of two classes of social actors namely “the role occupants”, and the 
“implementing agencies”.462 While the role occupants comprise actors whose conducts the 
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law seeks to transform, the implementing agencies have the obligation of increasing the 
possibility that the principal role occupant adapt their conducts to prescriptions addressed to 
them.463 Basically, the purport of ILTAM is to address the problematic behaviours of the 
role occupant and the implementing agencies. The problematic behaviour of the primary role 
occupant and the implementing agencies make up the social problem.464 This thesis presents 
the incidence of gas flaring and its impact in the Niger Delta as a social problem to be 
addressed by law.  Within the context of this thesis, the primary role occupants are the IOCs 
operating in the Niger Delta, and the implementing agencies include such agencies as DPR, 
NESREA and NOSDRA.   
This thesis is particularly interested in the participation, in the reform process, of persons 
affected by gas flaring which may be encouraged through ILTAM’s interest in transparency, 
clear problem identification and public participation in the enactment and monitoring of 
legislation. ILTAM emphasizes that the effectiveness of legislation does not conclude with its 
drafting. The ILTAM demands monitoring and assessing the enforcement and social 
implication of every new legislation ex post to evaluate whether and how the legislation 
induces its specified behaviour and helps to resolve the targeted social problem.465 The 
ILTAM compels the lawmaker to make certain that in the bill itself, there is a provision for 
an effective, transparent, accountable and participatory monitoring and assessment 
mechanism by persons affected by the social problem.466 This mechanism could stipulate 
conditions for collecting the evidence and feedback needed to evaluate whether the law has 
induced its specified behaviour and helped to resolve the targeted social problem.467 This 
mechanism could encourage public participation of persons affected by the impact of gas 
flaring in the Niger Delta in monitoring, assessing and providing feedback on the 
effectiveness of the law in order to resolve the targeted social problem. 
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Cohen and Uphoff posit that public participation takes various forms including participation 
in decision-making, participation in benefits as well as participation in implementation.468 
The argument in support of public participation can be segmented into the “process-based 
goals perspective” and the “substantive-based goals perspective”.469 While the “process-
based goals perspective” views public participation as an end in itself, the “substantive-based 
goals perspective” views public participation as contributing to some further result.470 From 
the process-based goals perspective, public participation is imperative because it can bolster 
local communities and other groups, provide legitimacy to decisions, aid governmental 
accountability, mitigate conflicts among competing interests, and present the public an 
opportunity to voice their concerns.471 From the “substantive-based goals perspective”, public 
participation is necessary because it can serve as a path that results in decisions that are more 
environmentally protective and better reflect public value and local desires.472 Both 
perspectives view public participation as contributing to sustainable development.473 As 
indicated earlier, the AGRA does not take environmental principles such as sustainable 
development into account. Although sustainable development is imprecise and lacks an exact 
definition, public participation is imperative in order for any decision related to development 
to be sustainable.474 Indeed, one of the essential requirements for the attainment of 
sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-making.475 Notwithstanding 
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the benefits of public participation, it has been criticized on the grounds inter alia that special 
interest groups canvassing views that are opposed to public opinion on environmental matters 
are particularly more powerful.476 Overall, like other democratic values, public participation 
remains imperative. The ILTAM focuses, inter alia, on public participation in the monitoring 
and evaluation of laws. It requires that the monitoring and evaluation procedure must be 
“transparent and accountable” and “must ensure that those affected, especially the poor and 
vulnerable, have opportunity to provide input and feedback of relevant evidence as to the 
law’s impact on their lives”.477 
In order to aid the process of policy/law enforcement, scholars such as Masango have argued 
for the involvement of citizens in the enforcement process where practicable.478 Public 
participation has the capacity to encourage compliance with the law, and reduce the 
likelihood of implementing agencies’ misuse of power.479 Odumosu-Ayanu has argued for 
the inclusion of host and affected communities in the decision-making process in response to 
the conflicting goals triggered by investment projects.480 The involvement of host and 
affected communities will impact regulation and encourage stronger regulatory decision-
making and implementation as regulators may be compelled to ensure better enforcement by 
local communities. This inclusion of local communities has the capacity to reduce 
environmental harm, improve regulatory compliance, and is seen as a “a democratizing shift” 
which “aligns neatly with a move away from a ‘command and control’ orientation of 
government”.481 
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Omoregbe argues that although local communities are not described in any national laws in 
Nigeria, there is no dispute regarding what a community means and who a member of a 
community entails.482 Local communities are persons who are “customarily resident or who 
are widely known as the owners of the land upon which the development is taking place”.483 
She argues that any proposed solution that does not put into consideration the rights of local 
communities will most likely fail.484 Indeed, the democratic process ensures effective 
empowerment of the public expressed through legislation.485 Omoregbe also argues that the 
only way resources can be peacefully exploited is by giving the local communities a voice in 
the development of energy, oil and mineral resources process.486 
Odumosu-Ayanu has expressed the view that local communities can participate in foreign 
investment projects in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector through binding contracts.487 In proposing 
a multi-actor approach to investment contracts, she writes that the contractual approach does 
not envision the local communities undertaking a regulatory role, as regulators will retain 
their regulatory powers.488 Basically, the contractual approach responds to the government’s 
regulatory challenges and inadequacies.489 It enhances the fulfillment of the ideal of 
democratic governance. The contractual approach entails an agreement between the IOCs, 
host communities and the government which allows the host communities to obtain factual 
evidence and feedback needed to ascertain whether gas flaring is effectively being addressed 
by the legislation. This contractual approach could be particularly beneficial in unstable 
economic circumstances in view of the fact that it permits oversight by host communities at 
times when governments may prefer to concentrate on economic stability to the detriment of 
                                                          
482 Yinka Omorogbe, “The Legal Framework for Public Participation in Decision-making on Mining and Energy 
Development in Nigeria: Giving Voices to the Voiceless” online: 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253784.001.0001/acprof-
9780199253784-chapter-15>. 
483 Ibid. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid. 
486 Ibid. 
487 See Odumosu-Ayanu 2014, supra note 92 at 306. 
488 Ibid at 307. 
489 Ibid at 300. 
93 
 
other pertinent issues such as environmental protection.490 Given that communities are often 
in close proximity to sites of gas flaring, they are better suited to provide reports of 
discrepancies with the regulator, monitor the effectiveness of the regulatory agency, and 
hold the regulator accountable.491 This thesis posits that the monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism in the new legislation will encourage public participation of persons affected by 
the incidence of gas flaring in order to ensure effective implementation.492 As earlier stated, 
the local communities do not usurp the powers of the regulatory agency as the local 
communities do not undertake regulatory roles. The implementing agency retains its 
implementing powers. 
However, this thesis has identified the lack of implementation of laws as a problematic 
behaviour of regulatory agencies that impacts the incidence of gas flaring in Nigeria. It bears 
reiterating that this problematic behaviour of regulatory agencies arises, in part, as a result of 
institutional overlaps and duplication of functions by regulatory agencies. It could also be 
attributed to NESREA’s inadequate monitoring of the government’s compliance with the 
provisions of international environmental standards as a result of the non-domestication of 
the standards, the unclear enforcement structures and responsibilities of the DPR in view of 
the absence of an explicit regulatory mandate to the DPR by the AGRA,493 and the 
unwillingness of the government to enforce its own laws. However, as earlier indicated, the 
successful adoption of the National Gas Policy and the signing of the Paris Agreement 
indicate the preparedness and willingness of the Nigerian government at this moment to 
effectively tackle the problem of gas flaring in Nigeria by legislative reform.494 Gas flaring 
reduction is also one of the key elements of Nigeria’s NDC under the Paris Agreement. 
In order to reduce the prevailing regulatory overlaps and duplication of functions, this thesis, 
in line with the provisions of the National Gas Policy and the PIGB, proposes that the 
current regulatory agencies could be consolidated into a single oil and gas regulatory body. 
                                                          
490 Ibid at 305. 
491 Ibid at 306. 
492 This presupposes a contractual arrangement between the role occupants (IOCs), host communities and the 
government in ensuring that gas flaring laws are implemented by the regulatory agency. 
493 Odumosu 2005, supra note 27 at 147. 
494 Also see New Flare Gas Regulations 2018, supra note 31. 
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This will save cost, lessen bureaucratic bottlenecks and avoid the unwarranted duplication of 
responsibilities. The proposed regulatory body will encompass the entire petroleum industry, 
absorb the activities of the current regulatory agencies and oversee some new regulatory 
activities that may be necessary. This agency should be responsible for the economic and 
technical regulation of the oil and gas sector in a manner that should not restrict foreign 
investment in the sector but should take into account Nigeria’s BITs and its contractual 
obligations with IOCs. The responsibilities envisioned to form part of the new regulatory 
agency’s authority should include upstream, midstream and downstream oil and gas 
regulation, as well as environmental compliance as it relates to the oil and gas sector. This 
responsibility to monitor compliance with environmental standards implicates the 
domestication of international environmental standards on GHG emissions to which Nigeria 
is a party. As earlier indicated, the Paris Agreement, for instance, requires each party to 
regularly provide a national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions of GHG by sources 
and removals by sink as well as information necessary to assess progress made in enforcing 
and achieving its NDC.495 The new agency could assist in providing information concerning 
the extent of Nigeria’s GHG emissions from gas flaring as well as information regarding the 
achievement of Nigeria’s NDC as it relates to gas flaring reduction. The possible limitation 
to the proposed consolidation of regulatory agencies lies in effectively transforming the 
present agencies into a strong new regulatory body. However, this will entail developing 
strong corporate values within the new agency that will ensure the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the new regulatory body.496 However, as earlier indicated in chapter one, the 
issue of corporate values does not fall within the scope of this thesis. 
4.1 Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the adequacy and effectiveness of the current legal regime for the 
reduction of GHG emissions from the flaring of natural gas, which often occurs as part of the 
oil and gas production process in Nigeria. It maintains that the continuous flaring of gas in 
Nigeria can be attributed, at least in part, to the ineffectiveness of the current laws on gas 
flaring, lack of sufficient resolve by the government to implement the legal framework for 
gas flaring, insufficient market and infrastructure for natural gas utilization in Nigeria, as well 
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as the imbalance in the conflicting foreign investment and environmental protection goals in 
Nigeria. However, this thesis focuses on legislative reforms. The thesis does not envision 
solving the problem of gas flaring in Nigeria through legislative reforms alone. It contends 
that legislative reform is an important step that must be undertaken by the Nigerian 
government as the current legislation governing gas flaring is inadequate, ineffective, and 
unconstitutional. 
Some conclusions can be drawn from the discussions in this thesis. First, the thesis 
advocates enacting new gas flaring legislation in Nigeria in order to address the 
shortcomings of the AGRA. Second, it proposes the domestication of some of the relevant 
international environmental standards on GHG emissions to which Nigeria is a party. 
Ultimately, in bringing these together, this thesis advocates the adoption of legislative 
reforms for addressing gas flaring and demonstrates that such legislative reforms will not be 
hindered by the legal framework for international investment in Nigeria. In particular, the 
proposed legislative reforms will not be impeded by claims of expropriation and stabilization 
requirements in oil and gas contracts. This thesis contends that legislative reforms could 
work at this time considering that the Nigerian government is beginning to demonstrate 
willingness to address gas flaring. In canvassing the argument for legislative reforms, this 
thesis presents some of the insights proposed by ILTAM as a possible tool for designing the 
reforms.  
The justification for this thesis is hinged on advancing the cause of environmental protection 
and climate change mitigation. The flaring of natural gas associated with oil and gas 
production contributes to climate change through the emissions of GHGs, and Nigeria is one 
of the highest gas flaring countries in the world. As mitigation involves lessening the 
emission of heat-absorbing GHGs into the atmosphere, either by decreasing sources of these 
gases or strengthening the ‘sink’ that gather and store the gases,497 the arguments canvassed 
in this thesis are imperative as they are intended to ensure the reduction of the emission of 
GHGs from gas flaring in Nigeria into the atmosphere by means of effective laws and 
regulation. Also, the arguments do not intend to restrict foreign investment but to ensure that 
IOCs carry on business in Nigeria in a responsible manner, taking into account, 
environmental and climatic considerations. 
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The legislative reforms advanced in this thesis is in line with the strategic objectives of the 
National Gas Policy. These strategic objectives of the National Gas Policy include ensuring 
gas flare out, and promoting gas utilization in Nigeria.498 Also, one of the visions of the 
National Gas Policy is to eliminate gas flaring and tackle environmental issues.499 However, 
the National Gas Policy does not provide a practical guide as to how this goal will be 
accomplished. Consequently, this research advocates enacting a piece of legislation with 
good chances of working, and domesticating international environmental standards on GHG 
emissions, while taking foreign investment goals into consideration. Legislative reform is an 
important measure that should be undertaken by the Nigerian government in addressing gas 
flaring.  
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